

THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Bulletin

Vol. XXXVI, No. 922

February 25, 1957

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February

Meeting the Threat of Communism in the Far East

by Walter S. Robertson

*Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs*¹

When I first accepted your invitation, the Middle Eastern crisis and the tremendous explosion of Hungary were just developing. A great deal has happened since with profound significance for our time. I should like to discuss with you tonight the relation of these events to our position in the Far East, which involves discussion of our China policy, and to give you my idea of your stake in international affairs.

Before I do so, however, I would like to ask you to bring to mind two significant historical facts of the era in which we are living.

The first of these facts, necessary to an understanding of our position in the Far East today, is the tremendous change which has occurred in American outlook.

One of the things that we Americans discovered when we were rudely awakened in 1941 from our dream of isolationism was that global peace and our own national security are indivisible. Reluctantly we came to accept the fact that aggression anywhere is a threat, however disguised or apparently remote, to our own freedom. We learned that events in one part of the world affect every other part. We learned that, no matter how remote the fire may be, we must help to put it out, lest it consume us all. We learned another uncomfortable lesson, too—that American wealth and productive capacity has given us power and with that power has come world leadership, unsought and unwanted. These are the lessons that we must now apply.

The second historical fact which I ask you to remember as we explore the international scene

of today this emergence of international communism as the one great, aggressive threat to the liberties of mankind. This threat is an integral part of the equation which we must solve.

When Lenin plotted his plans for world domination, he did not control a square inch of the world's territory. His possessions consisted of an economic and political philosophy—an idea—to which he gave passionate allegiance, a band of devoted fanatical disciples, and a fertile bed compounded of man's injustice to man in which to plant his seed. His plans were comprehensive and explicit. He brooked no permanent compromise. Coexistence, he wrote, for any length of time is unthinkable. He likened the Communist Party to a man ascending a steep, unexplored mountain who comes to an obstacle making further progress impossible. The man then, said Lenin, must descend, seek another path—longer, perhaps, but one which would enable him to reach the summit. He defined his summit in exact terms. "First," he said, "we will take Eastern Europe, then the masses of Asia, then we will surround America, the last citadel of capitalism. We won't have to attack; she will fall into our lap like an overripe fruit."

His blueprint has been followed with clocklike precision by his disciples. After the revolution in Russia had been consolidated, the Communists began one by one to pluck off every country of Eastern Europe—Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, East Germany, Albania. At Yalta in 1945 the Soviets were awarded the de facto control of Manchuria, the most strategic base in all Asia for the furtherance of Lenin's designs. The Soviets well

¹Address made before the Bloomington Association of Commerce, Bloomington, Ill., on Feb. 6 (press release 52 dated Feb. 5).

knew that they had within China a hard core of philosophical Marxists with a fanatical dedication matching their own. They well knew that Stalin had no more devoted disciple in the world than the leader of the Chinese Communists, Mao Tse-tung. When some American and other apologists were portraying Mao as spearheading a democratic revolution for agrarian reform, Mao was writing of himself, "I am a Marxist, dedicated to communizing China and the world under the leadership of Moscow." Within 4 years the Chinese Communists, in collusion with the Russians and armed and equipped with Japanese weapons turned over to them by the Russians, had taken possession of the mainland of China.

There followed in quick succession the invasion of Korea, the occupation of Tibet, and the war in Indochina. The Asian score? The mainland of China, North Korea, Tibet, North Viet-Nam, two provinces of Laos—Lenin's masses, plus strategic positions for future operations.

Starting from zero in our generation, the international Communists now hold in a grip of ruthless power 16 nations, 900 million people—a circumstance recently described by the Secretary of State as "the most frightening fact history records." This is a hard, uncompromising truth which is being constantly swept under the rug by the erstwhile and present-day wishful thinkers.

U.S. Response to Challenge

Thus we see that the leadership we have acquired as a gift of history is thrust into our hands at a moment when the world is confronted with a new problem to be solved. Our response to this challenge has been rapid and resolute. It has taken two principal forms. Broadly speaking, we led the free world in resisting aggression in any form and at the same time have tried to help others gain the strength to assist in making aggression unprofitable.

With other United Nations forces we resisted and checked the Communist challenge in Korea. We have also made clear our determination to aid in resisting further open aggression. Specifically, we have signed a security treaty with Japan and bilateral security treaties with the Republics of the Philippines, Korea, and China. The ANZUS treaty links Australia, New Zealand, and the United States in a defensive alliance. Australia and New Zealand also joined with the United

States, Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, Great Britain, and France in the SEATO treaty of alliance against aggression in Southeast Asia.

The second way in which we have met the Communist threat in the Far East has been to offer military, economic, and technical assistance to those nations desiring it and willing to use it to maintain their own independence.

Now, at a critical time, these same principles are being applied in a new area of the world where the threat of Communist expansion has again become acute. President Eisenhower has proposed a course of action to insure "the full sovereignty and independence of each and every nation of the Middle East."

The application of this policy will mean closing an obvious gap in the free world's chain of defenses beginning with NATO to the West and running through the Far East, where our defensive strength already has been heavily engaged. We thereby reduce the genuine risk of a breakthrough by the forces dedicated to the destruction of the free world. In doing this we of course accept new risks, but we do so with calculation, knowing that without some risk there can be no safety.

The President's decision to place a shield over the vulnerable Middle East had not yet been known before I concluded my most recent visit to the Far East in November-December last. Yet I found the peoples of that area engaged in reassessing their estimate of what generally many of them have heretofore regarded as some kind of power struggle between two great nations which they hoped would become none of their affair.

The forthright, unequivocal stand of the United States against aggression by anyone in the Middle East regardless of any considerations of expediency created a profound effect, resulting in a new prestige for the United States in Asia. This has been accompanied by a proportionate reduction in the suspicion of our motives which has characterized our relationships in some quarters in recent years. Since we are the close associate of colonial powers in Europe, the newly independent nations of Asia have not always been ready to accept our own statement of our intentions.

The words of President Eisenhower in announcing our steadfast American doctrine have had a welcome ring in the new nations of Asia.

... we cannot and we will not condone armed aggression—no matter who the attacker, and no matter who the victim.

We cannot—in the world, any more than in our own nation—subscribe to one law for the weak, another law for the strong; one law for those opposing us, another for those allied with us.

There can be only one law—or there will be no peace.

Those were words that Asia longed to hear. They have at a stroke, and by the actions which followed in the United Nations, given a new glow of Asian confidence in American objectives in the Far East. Yet we must remember that this new feeling of trust which these words and actions have created is as fragile as a new seedling, and we must constantly be on our guard against any act which would even faintly hint that America would compromise the principle behind them.

The Soviet aggression in Hungary was also a profound revelation to many an Asian who had heretofore clung to the words rather than the deeds of communism for comforting reassurance. In a single blinding flash the facade has come down and the stark structure of Soviet imperialism has been exposed in all its horror. There remain some apologists and some of faint heart, but their words are largely lost in the upsurge of indignation that has swept informed Asians in the wake of this Communist outrage.

Now I should be the last to tell you that as a result of our policies the threat of communism has been met in the Far East. On the contrary, the menacing shadow of the international Communists still lies heavily over the area. Yet I think there can be no question but that the course we have pursued has had a deterrent effect and has bought some of the time needed for the free nations of Asia to build the strength which they will require to retain their independence.

Of one thing I am confident: Simply because we have made a few gains, this is no time to talk of relaxing or softening the policies that we have pursued. Now is the time to press even more resolutely along the path we have chosen. Let me illustrate.

For some months prior to November 6 last, it was widely whispered at home and abroad that, once the elections were over, a change could be expected in America's policy with respect to non-recognition and opposition to U.N. membership for Communist China. The negotiations which have been carried on at Geneva since August 1, 1955, between American Ambassador Alexis Johnson and a representative of the Red Chinese regime, Wang Ping-nan, were cited as evidence that

the United States was negotiating a political accommodation with the Reds. As has been repeatedly stated, these negotiations were undertaken by the United States in an effort to obtain the release of our illegally imprisoned nationals and to obtain from the Red Chinese a meaningful agreement for the renunciation of force in the Taiwan area. Despite these clear statements and despite the fact that the Kelly resolution² opposing recognition and U.N. membership for the Peiping regime was passed by an overwhelming and unanimous vote of Congress—391 to 0 in the House and 86 to 0 in the Senate—and that the presidential candidates of both parties ran on platforms containing almost identical planks against such recognition and U.N. membership, these rumors were once more revived after the elections. Well, the elections are over and we have not changed our minds. I see no reason to expect that we will.

Bases of Policy Toward China

Our opposition to the Red regime in Peiping is not, as some have said, based upon the disapproval of an ideology or an economic system, much as we abhor both. We recognize many totalitarian governments and those with many economic systems, and we have not been unwilling to meet with them in the world forum of the United Nations. Nor is our policy, as our critics would have it, based on an "emotional reaction" to the Korean war. Our policy is a realistic one, rooted in principle as well as in the self-interest of the free world. It is based on three basic considerations.

The first of these considerations is the security interests of the United States and the free world's collective security, which is part and parcel of our own.

It is often forgotten by some critics that recognition of Communist China would, as a practical matter, mean the liquidation of the Republic of China on Formosa, with all that implies to our strategic, moral, and psychological position in opposition to Communist expansion in the Far East. When that is recalled, it is much easier to understand why we have established diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia, the homeland of communism, but not with Communist China.

Formosa is a vital link in the free world's island chain of defenses in the Pacific, all now covered by mutual defense treaties. The army on Formosa

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 20, 1956, p. 311.

of some 400,000 men, trained and equipped by the United States, is a powerful deterrent to Communist overt aggression in Korea and elsewhere in Asia. If Formosa should fall to the Communists, Japan, the Philippines, and all of Southeast Asia would be seriously threatened.

The second main consideration on which our policy is based is the interest of Asian countries in escaping Communist enslavement. If the United States were to abandon the Republic of China in order to placate the insatiable Red Chinese, no country in Asia could feel that they could longer rely on the protection of the United States against the Communist threat. These comparatively weak nations would have no other recourse than to come to terms, the best they could get, with the Peiping colossus.

Not only could we then expect the rapid expansion of communism throughout Asia, but the moral position of the United States, upon which we must inevitably rely for much of our strength, would suffer serious damage.

The third major consideration for our policy is the long-range interest of the Chinese people themselves.

The National Government is a symbol, the only rallying point in the world for non-Communist Chinese—the only alternative to communism for millions of Chinese on the mainland and throughout Southeast Asia. If the National Government should be liquidated, some 12 million overseas Chinese would automatically become citizens of Red China and potential cells of infiltration and subversion against the governments of the countries where they reside. Such an eventuality would become a matter of the gravest concern to the free countries of Asia.

Let no one say that we are denying representation to 600 million Chinese. The defiant Marxist imposters in Peiping come no closer to representing the true interests, aspirations, and will of the Chinese people than William Z. Foster comes to representing the will and aspirations of the American people. They are part and parcel of the apparatus of the international Communist conspiracy. Their regime was imposed by force with the volition of only an infinitesimal fraction of the Chinese people. It has been kept in power by bloody purges and the liquidation of some 18 millions of mainland Chinese in 7 years. Our Government is opposed to any action which would

create international prestige for this regime or to increase its capacity for advancing its plan for the communization of Asia or which would betray the hopes of those having the will to resist it.

Even if we were to consider the question of recognition from a purely legalistic point of view, there is no basis to be found either for recognition of Communist China by the United States or for admission of that regime to the United Nations.

By every standard of national and international conduct, Red China under its present regime is an outlaw nation. Recognition of a government involves not only de facto control of territory but also the ability and willingness to live up to international obligations. What has been the record of the Peiping regime? Seizing power in 1949, it promptly repudiated all the international obligations of the Government of China. It confiscated without compensation properties of other nationals valued in the hundreds of millions of dollars. It demanded and received as blackmail hundreds of thousands of dollars additional for granting exit visas to foreign nationals owning and/or operating these properties. It threw foreign citizens into prison without trial.

In 1950, having been in power less than a year, Red China invaded Korea and was promptly branded an aggressor against the peace of the world by U.N. resolution. That resolution is still outstanding. If Red China was an aggressor in 1950, it is an aggressor in 1957. Its armies are still in military occupation of North Korea. It has shown complete disregard for international commitments made on its own account. Signing an armistice in Korea in July 1953 calling for the exchange of all war prisoners, it held back groups of our prisoners and later bargained for their release. It brought into North Korea hundreds of modern airplanes and other combat equipment prohibited by the Armistice Agreement.

A similar pattern was followed in Indochina.

The Geneva agreement in 1954 governing the cease-fire in Viet-Nam was negotiated with the French by Chou En-lai, Red China's Foreign Minister, and Molotov, with the Viet Minh representative playing only a minor part. In flagrant violation of this agreement, the Communist puppet Viet Minh armies have been built up by the Red Chinese from 7 to 20 divisions and their artillery firepower increased some sixfold. Furthermore, on September 10, 1955, after long weeks

of negotiation, Red China made an unconditional public commitment to release all Americans detained in China against their will. There were 19 known Americans in jail on that date. Only 9 have been released, and the remaining 10 are now being held as political hostages in an effort to obtain political concessions.

Can this record qualify any regime for acceptance as a responsible representative government? I leave the answer in your hands.

Individual's Stake in World Affairs

That brings me to the question I would like to leave with you tonight. What is your stake in these international problems?

I think I can sum up the answer in one word—Bloomington, the Bloomington you know tonight, the Bloomington you plan for the morrow.

When you picked up your morning paper and read the uncensored news of the world, you probably gave no thought to the fact that you were exercising a privilege denied to hundreds of millions of people with whom you share this globe. Freedom of the press exists only in the free world.

When you go to a lecture or a political meeting and there find a speaker lambasting the national government, or the state government, or the city government, or anything else that might have aroused his ire, you do not need to be reminded that he is indulging a right purchased for you by the blood of your forefathers, the right to criticize—freedom of speech.

And on a Sunday morning, glorious with sunshine, when the call of the golf course is so strong that you find little difficulty in persuading yourself that on such a day and after such a hard week what you need most in all the world is exercise, pause long enough to remember that there is a precious privilege also available to you on this day, the right to go into the church or synagogue of your choice and worship God as you please. Freedom of worship is a foundation stone of American life.

And, when in the middle of the night there comes a sharp rap on the door, you go sleepily and grumpily expecting to receive a telegram or a special delivery letter, not in shrinking fear of being whisked away by dreaded secret police, without charge or warrant, to a fate unknown.

These simple things—priceless blessings which we so casually take for granted; all the rights,

privileges, freedoms, dignities guaranteed to us by a Bill of Rights wrought out of long, tortuous years of struggle and sacrifice; everything that goes to make up the warp and woof of your lives—all these represent your stake in international affairs.

Whatever international affairs may have involved in the past, the primary objective today is to save what we call our way of life from destruction. We are grievously threatened. We are threatened by an implacable enemy already holding more than one-third of the world's population in its grip, an enemy fired by an evil ideology fanatically dedicated to the communization of the world, an enemy which philosophically would make society better by destroying everything in society which makes it good.

What can we do to save ourselves? I believe that our ability to prevent the Communists from launching an all-out war of conquest at some time of their choosing depends on our strength and the strength of our allies. Our international programs are dedicated to making the free world strong, to holding and winning allies to the cause of freedom, to arousing the masses of the world to its peril.

We continue to seek peace with all men. Yet we do not believe that peace is attainable through giving the aggressor what he seeks. On the contrary, the firmer we stand, the cooler our nerve, the more united we are, the more likely we are to come through the tensions of this time without resort to war and with our freedom intact.

United States and Poland To Hold Economic Talks

Press release 55 dated February 7

The United States has invited the Polish Government to hold economic talks in Washington in order to explore certain questions involved in expanding economic relations between the two countries. The Polish Government has already indicated a readiness to send financial and commercial experts to Washington for this purpose. The talks are expected to include, in particular, consideration of Poland's interest in obtaining U.S. agricultural commodities in surplus supply. It is expected that the discussions will take place in the near future.

Secretary Dulles' News Conference of February 5

Press release 53 dated February 5

Secretary Dulles: I am sorry that I was not able to meet with you during the month of January. I planned it once or twice, but I had other engagements that turned out to be more pressing. I am glad to be here today and will answer any questions that you ask, if I can.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you favor use of sanctions against Israel if it refused to withdraw from Gaza and the Gulf of Aqaba?

A. Well, that is a question we could only answer within the context of a United Nations resolution. We would not take any action in the way of sanctions unilaterally. If there was action by United Nations calling for sanctions, we would of course have to give them very serious consideration.

Q. Does the United States favor certain sanctions?

A. Well, that is a hypothetical question which I would prefer not to answer because our thinking certainly is in terms of compliance by Israel with the terms of this resolution, and we have good ground to hope, at least, that this resolution will be complied with and we have not gone on to think what would happen if it did not. Ambassador Lodge made the statement if it was not complied with, it could not be predicted what would happen.¹ I would prefer myself not to make that prediction.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we have been committed, as I understand it, through the United Nations, and through the Tripartite Agreement of 1950 and various other statements that this administration has made, to support what might be called the existence of Israel. Would we go to the protection of that existence of Israel to the extent, as our pol-

icy now stands, of risking war with the Soviet Union?

A. I don't think we would be deterred from taking any course we thought right because of fear of what the Soviet Union might do. That would put the Soviet Union in the position of being able to dictate our policy and swerve us from what we thought the right course. I cannot imagine that we would be influenced from what we thought right because of fear of what the Soviet Union might do. We have repeatedly faced up to situations where the Soviet Union made serious threats if we did something, and we went ahead and did it, and I think that is the proper course to pursue.

Congressional Review of Middle East Policy

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what the situation is regarding State Department activity in connection with the Senate request for documents and material relating to Middle East policy?

A. We started the work going, I think, in the Historical Division. It is a task of very great magnitude which will involve reviewing several hundred thousand, I suppose, of documents, and it covers a span of 11 years, but the work is already started actively. I cannot yet give the time forecast as to when it will be completed, and one matter we want to discuss, I think, with the committee is whether they want to get it on a year-by-year basis or wait and get it all at one time. We will presumably start our work going back to 1946, which is the year beginning, and we could prepare this perhaps on a year-by-year basis or wait until it is all available.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you anticipate hearings to follow after you have collected this information and passed it on to the committee?

A. Well, we have no reason to anticipate that. Of course, that is up to the Senate to decide, but

¹ See p. 327.

the original suggestion at the hearings has been modified in favor of the written report and I suppose the Senate will then consider, in the light of the written report, whether it will be important to have hearings or not. But we have no reason to anticipate that.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what did you have in mind when testifying on the Hill that the white paper would adversely affect our relations with Britain and France?

A. I said, if it involved disclosure of confidential information. Of course, a great deal of what transpired is reflected in exchanges of communications which, in accordance with accepted international practice, should not be made public without the consent of the other governments concerned. Any effort to force the publication without that would have an adverse effect upon our relations. I think also the content of some of this would have a serious effect upon relations. Sometimes the story of these events cannot be fully told until some time after, when they are of interest to historians rather than politicians.

Q. Then for the time being you feel that this story cannot be fully told?

A. I do not think it can now be fully told.

Policy Toward Red China

Q. Mr. Secretary, in recent weeks there has been a feeling the United States might be considering a change in its policy toward Red China. There have been reports the United States is actively working for increasing trade restrictions with the Chinese Communists. I wonder if you could clarify what our position is and will be with regard to Red China?

A. I am not aware of any change whatsoever in our position. I don't know of any change with reference to trade other than the normal meetings of CHINCOM, which is a committee which deals currently with these matters and meets from time to time. But nothing has been brought personally to my attention in that situation to suggest anything that is abnormal and involving any change in policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on one aspect of that question, would you give us your philosophy about the policy of denying access to reporters in China, particularly the apparent failure to draw these

distinctions between a reporter going there to do his job and, say, a businessman going there to sell a product?

A. Well, my philosophy is, I think, in that respect the same as the President expressed at a recent press conference, that we don't like to have American citizens used as a means of coercion against the United States Government. As you know, of course, the Chinese Communist Government has for some time been trying to get reporters—preferably those it picked—to come into Communist China, and it has repeatedly tried to use the illegal detention of Americans in Communist China as a means of pressure to accomplish its ends in that respect.² We do not think that it is sound philosophy to permit other governments—other regimes—to feel that it is profitable business for them to withhold and detain illegally and throw into jail American citizens so they can put a price on their release. If we allow that to happen in one case, then I think the safety of all Americans throughout the world is lowered by several degrees for a long time in the future. It is a fact that the Chinese Communists are trying to use Americans to accomplish that end, which makes us reluctant to do it. If the Americans were released, then we would, of course, give a new look at the situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in the negotiations for the Dhahran air base has any attempt been made to get an agreement from King Saud to discontinue discrimination against American personnel there?

A. The talks with King Saud's counselors are going on, and I prefer not to comment on the progress of those talks while they are in progress.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you shed any light on who the mystery patient in the Kremlin is?

A. No, I am sorry to say that our intelligence people have not been able to identify him. We think we know quite a few people who he is not, but just who he is is much more difficult to say.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to get back to the reporters in China for a moment, do you believe that any reports coming out of there from bona fide American correspondents will be inevitably beneficial to the Chinese Communists?

² For a statement on the failure of Communist China to release imprisoned Americans, see BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1957, p. 261.

A. No, sir. Our policy is in no sense at all dictated by a desire to withhold from the American people any information about Communist China. It is solely dictated by the fact that we do not want to see the Chinese Communists gain their ends by the means of holding Americans in jail.

Q. Sir, that being so, and your statement that you do not think that reports by bona fide American correspondents, if they were to operate from China, would be beneficial necessarily to the regime—against that background what is the connection then between the State Department's or the administration's policy of banning American correspondents going to China—to Communist China—and the position of the American prisoners? I don't get the bridge between the two.

A. The bridge is one that was built by the Chinese Communists, not by us. There is no necessary connection whatsoever. The Chinese Communists have made the connection. They have said, in effect, that they want to have certain American correspondents come to Communist China and will hold Americans in jail until we allow them to come. Now that is the situation we are faced with.

Q. But, Mr. Secretary, surely it is true that this was the policy before they were holding these prisoners. We were denied the right to send a correspondent to China even before the present situation existed.

A. I am not aware that any correspondents tried to go to China before that time. It didn't come to my knowledge. But the connection you refer to is the connection, not made by us but made by the Chinese Communists.

Q. Just to pursue it a little further, Mr. Secretary, in that case is it correct, then, to say if some bona fide American correspondent whom the Chinese have not said that they wanted was able to get permission from Peiping that this would not necessarily be a contradiction of your policy if the State Department gave him a passport?

A. Well, it is very difficult for me to conceive of any American correspondent going to Communist China against the wishes of the Chinese Communist Government.

Q. I am simply raising the point because I am confused about your definition of what that cate-

gory is of sending certain correspondents that they would like to have.

A. I thought you put the case of somebody that they didn't like to have going.

Q. I did, but I—

A. I say that is a case which cannot exist.

Q. I realize that, sir, but I am simply trying to get at what you think is their definition of correspondents they would like to have come.

A. I don't know how they define whom they would like to have come. All I do know is that they first tried to use the American fliers that they held illegally under the armistice as a means of getting Americans—particularly the families of the fliers—in. And the first talks that took place with reference to that matter indicated that they were prepared to make a deal and that they would release these fliers if we would drop the ban upon the families and, for that matter, upon the American correspondents going in. We declined to make that deal. Finally we got the fliers out.³ They have proposed to make the same deal in essence with reference to the American civilians. We have so far refused to make that deal. We have got all of the civilians out except 10. I don't believe that the bodies of American citizens ought to be made a subject for that kind of barter. So long as the Chinese Communists make the connection, we cannot escape the consequences of that connection or escape the fact that, if we give in to it, it puts a premium for all time and at all places upon seizing and imprisoning Americans illegally and then bargaining as to the terms upon which they will be allowed to get out. That kind of blackmail I don't propose to satisfy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have they made any recent representations at Geneva along the lines you just mentioned, swapping the 10 American civilians in prison?

A. No, not directly.

Q. Sir, does this passport apply to correspondents of other nationalities to go to Red China? Would those correspondents be allowed to come to the United States after they go to China?

A. We are not trying to run other governments.

³ *Ibid.*, June 13, 1955, p. 953, and Aug. 15, 1955, p. 262.

They decide for themselves whether they let their people go to China.

Q. No, but suppose they then want to come to the U.S. Is there any objection?

A. None at all.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the United States plan any further action against the three correspondents who did go into Red China; I believe they are all out, although they may not be in this country.

A. I believe that matter is being studied.

Oil Shipments to Europe

Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a very serious oil shortage in Europe and this administration has appealed to the oil industry here, but so far without success. Some high personages in the administration believe that the only thing left is for the President to make an appeal. I was wondering whether you have been considering to ask the President to do that.

A. I do not think that the situation is one which, perhaps, calls for such measures as a Presidential appeal. It might assume those proportions. On the whole, the oil has been moving to Europe in one way or another in quantities which are not as good as we had hoped but still are pretty substantial. There has been a very considerable increase in shipment from this country, although not as much as we had hoped for, largely due to the reluctance of the Texas Railroad Commission to cooperate. But there has also been a diversion from the Middle East of oil which normally comes to the eastern seaboard and an appreciable increase of shipments from Venezuela. So, from those combined sources, there has been a very considerable measure of absorption of the loss which otherwise would have occurred. Now the detailed figures I don't have at my fingertips. You can get them, I think, from Mr. Flemming's office [Office of Defense Mobilization]. As I say, they fall somewhat below what they had hoped for, but not to a large degree.

Q. Sixty percent of what was expected?

A. That would not check with my figures, if you take into account the diversions from the Middle East and Venezuela.

Q. Mr. Secretary, under the administration's proposed resolutions for the Middle East, is it the administration's intention that some of the funds be used to promote the development of democratic institutions in the Arab States, and, if so, how can that be accomplished?

A. Well, the promotion of democratic processes in other countries is a matter which must always be primarily the concern to the country itself. It is not possible for one country to export to another its particular political and social processes. We can, largely through example, lead to the spread of our processes. That was the original concept, indeed, of the founders of this Government, who said, as I recall, in the opening paragraph of *The Federalist* papers, "It seems to have been reserved for the American people by their conduct and example" to show that free societies can function for the benefit of mankind. Primarily you have got to do these things by conduct and example and by bringing home to the people of other countries knowledge of what we do and what the results of it are. It is primarily an educational process. It is not a result which can be bought or coerced in any way.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Congressman Lanham and a score of other Congressmen have asked for a full-scale investigation of the Japanese cotton-textile exporting program,⁴ calling it a nameless arrangement outside the law. Do you have any comment on this?

A. Well, I take it that it is always competent for a foreign country, such as Japan, to voluntarily limit its exports to another country. That has been done repeatedly, and I don't know just what it means to say it is "outside the law." Of course it is outside our law, because Japan is outside our law.

Q. Sir, the Congressmen indicated that the State Department by cooperating with the Japanese to arrive at this export quota program was in effect trying to encroach upon the responsibility of Congress to set legislation or import quotas—that it was a way to get around Congress setting import quotas and the State Department taking over Congress's prerogatives.

A. We couldn't take over Congress' preroga-

⁴*Ibid.*, Feb. 11, 1957, p. 218.

tives. There is no way I know of where the State Department can stop the Congress from acting.

Middle East

Q. Mr. Secretary, I believe it was said that it was hoped that the Congress will have the Middle East resolution by February 1. It will be some time after that before the action is taken finally. I wonder if you think this delay has any weakening psychological effect.

A. Well, somewhat, but I don't think that it is at this point serious. I think that there is a recognition everywhere that the matter is being given active consideration by the Congress, that it is not practicing dilatory tactics, and I think, as long as the world has the impression that Congress is moving ahead in an orderly and expeditious way, that it will not have a grave effect. I think, if it should be felt that there was any filibustering or dilatory tactics being practiced, then it could seriously affect the situation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in a final vote Saturday night in the General Assembly on the Gaza-Aqaba question, all the Arab delegations and the Communist delegations ended up in one camp and we in another. Do you expect a different result at the conclusion of the debate on Algeria?

A. Of course, your diagnosis is largely true but not quite true because also in that same camp were France, Israel, and the Netherlands, if you are speaking about the abstentions on the second resolution?

Q. Yes, sir.

A. I think and certainly I hope that the debate on Algeria primarily will be an exchange of views. I think an exchange of views in these cases is often very valuable, and one of the roles of the General Assembly is to be an arena for discussion and debate and exchange of views. I do not know whether it is possible or would be an advantage to try to arrive at any substantive resolution which would be voted upon, and perhaps it would be better and perhaps would help the whole situation if that was not attempted. These issues are very complicated, and it is not very easy to put them in the framework of a resolution.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is the status of the 1950 Tripartite Agreement? Has it been made invalid by recent events, or does it still involve commit-

ment of the United States, for example, under certain circumstances to Britain and France?

A. Well, the United States abides by the policy declaration that was expressed in the Tripartite Agreement. I am not sure that the other parties feel equally bound by it, but it still constitutes an expression of the United States policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do we still consider it a valid agreement?

A. We still consider it an outstanding statement of United States policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the long-projected state visit of Marshal Tito has been "on again, off again" for the past few weeks. Can you tell us whether there has been any new development and how it stands at the moment?

A. Well, it has never been "on" in the sense that perhaps that word would be normally understood, in the sense that there was an agreed date for a visit. As I said, I think, in my last press conference here with you—that is, last December, I think⁵—the United States Government does think that it would be useful if there were an exchange of views between President Eisenhower and President Tito, and there have been conversations which were looking toward a firming up of that viewpoint and the fixing of a definite date. No date has been fixed, but the general point of view continues as I expressed it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I don't think you have publicly expressed your view on the latest version of the Bricker amendment. Can you tell us whether it is any more acceptable to the administration?

A. It is being studied, I know, by the Attorney General, and the views of the State Department have been sought. As far as I am aware, there has been no final conclusion reached, but my general impression is that it is not a resolution which conforms with what the President has said as to the conditions that he would attach to supporting an amendment. As I recall, he said that he would not do so if it did more than clarify what he understood the law now to be and did not subtract from the traditional powers of the President in relation to the conduct of foreign affairs. Now my impression is that this does not fit into the framework of the President's statement in that

⁵ Ibid., Jan. 7, 1957, p. 3.

respect, but, as I say, I have not yet seen the final study made by the Department of Justice.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you consider India in violation of the United Nations for its stand on the Kashmir?

A. No, I would not say that there is yet violation, and we hope that there will not be.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the President and various other individuals have commented on the very bitter and personal attacks made against you in Congress. What is your comment on these comments, sir, that you were to blame for the Middle East crisis?

A. Well, let me say, first, that I don't think that there have been any "bitter" attacks on me. There have been some speeches that were reminiscent of the recent campaign, but even those were not any more bitter than is traditional in American politics. I feel that the position which the United States took in this matter has been an honorable position and a sound position and one that will be justified by the verdict of history. We complied with what we believed to be a very basic and fundamental principle if there is to be world order—namely, that force should not be used against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state other than as is authorized by the charter of the United Nations. That authorizes the use of armed forces only in defense against an armed attack.

Now, it is not easy to apply these principles where they seem to be broken by your friends. It is very easy to apply them as against those who are hostile. It is much harder to apply them where the breach seems to be committed by those who are your friends. But if you are going to have a world where law and order and justice prevail, there must, as President Eisenhower said, be one rule which applies to all.

I think the decision which the United States took last November was perhaps the most difficult decision that we ever had to take, but I think it may also prove to be in the long run the most historically important decision that we have had to take in recent times.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I am a little confused about what you said about newsmen in Red China. A couple of years ago, Doris Fleeson and I [May Craig] asked permission to go. Mr. Suydam, after a lapse of 2 weeks, said that the State De-

partment position was that no American correspondent should go because we do not have relations with them and our Government could not protect us. He said that only one other correspondent, Joe Alsop, had asked, and that it had been denied on that ground. Well, now, with or without the release of prisoners, the ground would still be that you couldn't protect us there unless you recognized them?

A. Well, there is a problem which would always exist about the issuance of a passport valid for Communist China, and I do not think under any circumstances that so long as the present state of at least semiwar prevails, and we do not recognize that regime, that we would issue a passport valid for Communist China. Now, then, you get into all sorts of refinements, however, as to whether or not a correspondent wishes to go without claiming any protection from the United States Government. Now, I don't know whether that was involved in your case or not. But the issuance of passports to a regime which is not recognized is something which is never done.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what prospect is there for a meeting in the predictable future among the leaders of the United States, Britain, and France, either on a tripartite basis or bilaterally?

A. There has been no discussion, as far as I am aware, of any tripartite meeting. It would be normal that in due course there would be bilateral meetings between the head of the British Government and President Eisenhower and also between the head of the French Government and President Eisenhower. Nothing definite in those respects has been fixed at the present time, but it would be normal if that came about sometime or other in the not-too-distant future.

Q. Would you expect them to be held in Washington, these meetings?

A. Well, it is not advanced far enough yet so that I could say where they would be held.

Compliance With U.N. Resolutions

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said earlier that you had good ground to hope that Israel would comply with the resolution. Could you elaborate on this, as to why you had these hopes?

A. Well, I have those hopes because Israel is a country which, like most of the free nations of the

world, has what we call in our Declaration of Independence "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind," and I would think that a country like Israel, which naturally has that respect and which also depends very largely for its continued existence upon the good will of many other nations, would pay a respect to the overwhelming verdict of the world community as expressed in the United Nations General Assembly. After all, you had a vote there with only two negatives—that of Israel itself and of France—and that is a pretty impressive thing. I am not basing myself on any special inside information as to what Israel would do but merely on the fact that I would think a country which has the traditions of Israel, the democratic instincts of Israel, which is itself the creation of the United Nations, would have a decent respect for such an overwhelming verdict of the United Nations as was expressed last Saturday night.

Q. Mr. Secretary, on that point, would you apply the same reasoning to Egypt in the light of Egypt defying the United Nations on the free passage of Israeli ships through the Suez Canal?

A. I would think that Egypt could also be expected to respect the verdict or the voice of the United Nations General Assembly. Of course, that matter has never been in any concrete form before the General Assembly. There was this verdict or decision by the Security Council in 1951, but no efforts were made at that time to put any strong moral support behind that decision of the Security Council, and it was allowed more or less to go by default. But I think that there is a greater recognition now, perhaps, than there was then, of the necessity of a general compliance with the armistice and a hope that there will come a period of tranquillity, if not formalized peace, to that area. I would expect that the strong present desire, which I sense in the nations of the world, to see that come about would also have an influence on Egypt.

Q. Mr. Secretary, referring to your question or to your answer on Kashmir, do you feel that further action could be taken by the U.N. General Assembly toward the carrying out of a plebiscite there?

A. Well, we continue to believe that, unless the parties are able to agree upon some other solution, the solution which was recommended by the Se-

curity Council should prevail, which is that there should be a plebiscite.

Q. Mr. Secretary, from your answer to an earlier question, can we assume that you have no present plans now to resign or retire?

A. I have no present plans now to resign or retire.

Q. Mr. Secretary, while you were under the congressional barrage last week, the President told us that you had a wisdom and knowledge perhaps unmatched in the world today. Would you like to tell us how that made you feel at a time like that?

A. Well, it makes you feel pretty good when a person with the wisdom and experience of President Eisenhower says a thing like that about you. It makes your heart warm.

Euratom Committee Proposes Fuel Program for Europe

Following is the text of a statement issued by the White House on February 6 following a conference between President Eisenhower and Louis Armand, Franz Etzel, and Francesco Giordani, representing the countries negotiating a treaty establishing a European atomic energy community, together with a communique issued on February 8 at the conclusion of the committee's visit to Washington.¹

WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT²

The group reviewed the main items of their proposal for the construction of nuclear power plants. They stressed that a large-scale program for the industrial application of nuclear power carried out within an integrated European community would provide new opportunities for significant cooperation between the United States and Europe in the spirit of the President's atom-for-peace program.

The President reiterated his strong and continuing support for European integration. He

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1957, p. 20, and Feb. 18, 1957, p. 250.

² Read to correspondents on Feb. 6 by Acting Press Secretary Murray Snyder.

expressed his hope that the creation of a European atomic energy community would permit the development of a fruitful partnership with the United States, to the benefit of the entire free world.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE¹

1. A Committee appointed by the Governments of Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands which are negotiating at Brussels the treaty for a European atomic energy community (EURATOM) concluded today its official visit in Washington. The Committee, composed of Mr. Louis Armand, Mr. Franz Etzel and Professor Francesco Giordani, called on President Eisenhower, the Secretary of State, and the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and held discussions with officials of the Department of State and the Commission.

2. The Committee's task is to determine the extent to which atomic power can meet Europe's growing energy needs. The availability and cost of energy has become a limiting factor on the growth of Europe's economic strength and welfare. The Committee's review of the needs and possibilities has led it to adopt as an objective the stabilization of fuel imports early in the 1960's. To meet this target would require that nuclear power plants with a total generating capacity of 15,000,000 KW be installed within the next ten years.

3. Examination of the Committee's program indicates that its objective is feasible. Under present circumstances, the availability of nuclear fuels is not considered to be a limiting factor. A joint group of experts to be designated by the Committee and the Atomic Energy Commission will continue to examine the technical problems posed by the Committee's objective.

4. The Committee pointed out that the Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) which will result from the present Brussels negotiations provides the framework and the stimulus required to realize the Committee's objective. It would mobilize in Europe the technical and industrial resources required and would provide a political entity com-

petent to afford adequate safeguards and to enter into comprehensive and practical engagements with the U.S. Government.

5. The U.S. Government welcomes the initiative taken in the Committee's proposal for a bold and imaginative application of nuclear energy. On February 22, 1956, President Eisenhower in announcing the allocation of 20,000 kilograms of U-235 for sale or lease outside the U.S. for peaceful purposes (principally power and research reactors) stated, "Significant actions are under way to create an international agency and an integrated community for Western Europe to develop peaceful uses of atomic energy. The United States welcomes this progress and will cooperate with such agencies when they come into existence."⁴ The United States anticipates active association in the achievement of the Committee's objective, and foresees a fruitful two-way exchange of experience and technical development, opening a new area for mutually beneficial action on both the governmental and the industrial level and reinforcing solidarity within Europe and across the Atlantic.

Soviet Expulsion of U.S. Attachés

*Statement by Lincoln White
Acting Chief, News Division¹*

The Department has just been notified that the Soviet Government has ordered the expulsion of two American Assistant Naval Attachés, Capt. Paul R. Uffelman, USMC, and Lt. William S. Lewis, USN. These officers have been falsely accused by the Soviet Government of engaging in spying activities. This expulsion order closely follows an elaborately staged "press conference" in Moscow yesterday by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, at which four Soviet citizens were falsely presented as U.S. spies and a whole series of earlier charges of so-called U.S. spying activities going back over the whole postwar period were again brought forth.

Only 8 days have passed since the Soviet Government ordered the expulsion of two U.S. Assistant Military Attachés on equally spurious es-

¹ Issued on Feb. 8 (press release 58) by the Department of State, the Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, and the EURATOM Committee.

⁴ BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 469.

¹ Made to correspondents on Feb. 7.

pionage charges. This, you will recall, was January 30 and the attachés were Maj. Hubert E. Tansey and Capt. Charles W. Stockell.

The revival of old propaganda charges and the fabrication of new incidents by the Soviet Government apparently is timed to provide material in an effort to support the Soviets' false claims of U.S. interference in the internal affairs of the countries of Eastern Europe. These charges, moreover, derive from the understandably extreme sensitivity of the Soviet Government to the overwhelming U.N. condemnation of Soviet aggression in Hungary.

The expulsion of the four American military officers on false charges can be presumed to be in retaliation against revelations of actual Soviet espionage activities in the United States. During the past year, a number of Soviet officials have been expelled from the United States for improper activities. As you all recall, recently three U.S. citizens were indicted in New York for participation in Soviet espionage activities.

Now, as regards the two American Assistant Naval Attachés, namely Lieutenant Lewis and

Captain Uffelman. They were physically assaulted on a Leningrad street recently (January 26) by a group of persons dressed in civilian clothes. A Soviet militiaman stood by during the assault. Only when these persons had seized Lieutenant Lewis' camera did the militiaman intervene, taking the camera from the civilians. Notwithstanding the fact that the American officers presented their diplomatic cards, the militiaman refused to return Lieutenant Lewis' camera, which he had been carrying in an open area as permitted by Soviet law.

The American officers were ordered to enter a police station under threat of force after they had fully identified themselves and informed the militia that they considered themselves to have been arrested. After statements were taken from "witnesses," the American officers were permitted to depart.

Incidentally, I am told that, of the four alleged spies produced in Moscow yesterday, three have been previously produced on previous occasions making virtually the same allegations.

Visit of King Saud of Saudi Arabia

Following is the text of a joint communique issued on February 8 following the discussions held by King Saud and President Eisenhower during the former's state visit to Washington, together with greetings exchanged on King Saud's arrival on January 30 and a list of his official party.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

White House press release dated February 8

His Majesty Saud ibn Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud, King of Saudi Arabia, and President Eisenhower today concluded the series of discussions which they have held during King Saud's state visit. His Majesty and the President met previously on January 30 and February 1. Their discussions have been supplemented during the past week by further meetings between His Majesty and his advisers with the Secretary of State and other American officials.

These meetings provided the opportunity to reaffirm the close friendship which has so long existed between Saudi Arabia and the United States. In an atmosphere of cordiality, the King and the President exchanged views on how the two nations might work together to strengthen the peace of the Middle East.

The two Heads of State reached full agreement on the following:

1. Saudi Arabia, by virtue of its spiritual, geographical, and economic position, is of vital importance in the Middle East. It is in the interests of world peace that this Kingdom be strengthened for the maintenance of its own stability and the safeguarding and progressive development of its institutions.

2. The two Governments will exert efforts to settle justly problems of the Middle East area by peaceful and legitimate means within the framework of the United Nations Charter. They assert

their firm opposition to the use of force from any source as a means of settling international disputes.

3. The aim of the peoples of the area is to maintain their full independence, live in peace, and enjoy economic freedom and prosperity. Any aggression against the political independence or territorial integrity of these nations and the intervention from any source in the affairs of the states of the area would be considered endangering peace and stability. Such actions should be opposed in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

4. His Majesty indicated his purpose to continue close cooperation with the United States and carried the expressed wishes of other Arab leaders to improve their relations with the United States. President Eisenhower explained the purposes of his proposals to Congress in relation to the Middle East, pointing out that they were designed to supplement the universal non-aggression principles expressed in the Charter of the United Nations and to promote the independence and proper aspirations of the Arab peoples. King Saud received with satisfaction this exposition and assured President Eisenhower that he welcomed every step that promotes the United Nations principles respecting independence and sovereignty of states and self-determination of peoples.

5. With respect to the military defense of Saudi Arabia, including the Dhahran Airfield, President Eisenhower assured His Majesty King Saud of the willingness of the United States to provide assistance for the strengthening of the Saudi Arabian armed forces within the constitutional processes of the United States. To this end, plans are being made by representatives of both countries for the supply of military equipment, services and training, for the purposes of defense and the maintenance of internal security in the Kingdom. In the same spirit, His Majesty King Saud assured President Eisenhower of His Majesty's intention that the United States continue for another five years to use the facilities accorded to it at the Dhahran Airfield under conditions provided for in the Agreement concluded between the two countries on June 18, 1951. The United States agreed to consider the provision of economic facilities that would serve to augment the combined aims and interests of the two countries.

6. The two Chiefs of State exchanged views on a number of other matters of common interest.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS AT AIRPORT

White House press release dated January 30

The President:

Your Majesty, on behalf of the American people, I welcome you to this country. We recognize in you both a leader of the Arabian people and a custodian of those cities most sacred to Islam. It is an honor to have you here.

We were fortunate, in the United States, in calling your late father, His Majesty King Saud, our friend.

We are equally fortunate in calling you our friend. And I look forward with great expectation to the conversations we shall have here of problems important to both our countries because we value your friendship and we believe out of these conversations should come results to strengthen and reaffirm the friendships that we have with your country.

King Saud: (through interpreter)

I have the great pleasure to extend to Your Excellency and to the American people my deep gratitude and appreciation of this warm welcome. I am indeed happy to respond to Your Excellency's call to renew and to consolidate the traditional friendship between our peoples, the foundations of which were laid down by my late father.

On behalf of my people, I wish to assure Your Excellency of our desire to establish our relationship with the American people on the basis of amity and mutual interest. I look forward to this opportunity provided to me by my visit to undertake with Your Excellency and your Government a discussion characterized by the same degree of complete frankness as indicated by Your Excellency.

May God the Almighty bestow upon us wisdom and sagacity and guide us all toward universal peace and goodwill.

MEMBERS OF OFFICIAL PARTY

The Department of State announced on January 25 (press release 39) the members of the official party accompanying King Saud on his visit to Washington. They are as follows:

Prince Muhammad ibn Saud Al-Kabir, cousin of the King
Prince Musaad ibn Abd al-Rahman, Chief of Royal Diwan
of Complaints

Prince Fahd ibn Saud, Minister of Defense

Prince Muhammad ibn Saud, son of the King

Prince Mashhur ibn Saud, son of the King

Prince Muhammad ibn Turki, cousin of the King

Shaikh Abdullah Al-Khayyal, Ambassador of Saudi
Arabia to the United States

Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, Royal Counselor and Deputy Foreign
Minister

Khalid Bey Abu Al-Walid, Royal Counselor

Shaikh Muhammad Surur, Royal Counselor and Minister
of Finance

Jamal Bey Al-Hussaini, Royal Counselor

Abd al-Rahman Azzam, Legal Adviser

Shaikh Abdullah Al-Sadun, Tribal Leader of Mutair

Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Al-Tassan, Acting Chief of Staff and
Director General of Civil Aviation

Abd al-Munim Mustafa, Legal Adviser

Shaikh Muhammad Ibn Dughaiter, Chief of Royal
Diwan (Telegraphic Bureau)

Abdullah Balkhair, Director General of Press, Broadcast-
ing, and Publications

George Wadsworth, American Ambassador to Saudi
Arabia

Victor Purse, Acting Chief of Protocol, Department of
State

Brig. Gen. Dale O. Smith, USAF, American Aide to the
King

Clement E. Conger, Assistant Chief of Protocol, Depart-
ment of State

Joseph W. Reap, Press Officer, Department of State

Mexico: Cooperation and Progress

by Roy R. Rubottom, Jr.

*Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs*¹

One look at the map will tell you why Mexico will always be of prime importance to us and why the United States will always be of prime importance to Mexico. The facts of geography are inescapable; and here the compelling fact is 1,935 miles of common frontier. There has to be continuous community of interest where there is such a long line of permanent contact. That border has helped shape the history of our two countries and the psychology of our peoples.

However, history as well as geography makes Mexico and the United States continuously important to each other. This is due in part to the historic circumstance of our parallel development as nations. First, in both cases, was the European settlement in a new world of colonies which were to achieve their independence and choose their own destinies as constitutional democracies. Along with our mutual growth as republics, our economic, diplomatic, and cultural relations with each other have been progressively extended and intensified. Increasing cooperation along and across the border has been symbolized in recent years by the interchange of visits between our

Chiefs of State: Presidents Roosevelt and Avila Camacho; Presidents Truman and Alemán; more recently, Presidents Eisenhower and Ruiz Cortines.

Mexico is the second largest Spanish-speaking country in the world and is the fourth largest of the American Republics, exceeded in area only by Brazil, Argentina, and the United States. With a population of around 31 million, it is also the third American Republic in population.

Size, strategic location, progressiveness, and a wealth of resources, both material and cultural, have given Mexico international stature and significance. In the Organization of American States, composed of the 21 Republics of this hemisphere, and in the United Nations, the voice of Mexico is heard often and eloquently in behalf of the free world. In this connection, let me recall that the Mexican flag under which the Mexican aviators fought in the South Pacific in World War II now stands in the Court of Heroic Flags in the historic Castle of Chapultepec. In keeping with this tradition of supporting the free world, more than 200,000 Mexican workers on December 13, 1956, the day of the Virgin of Guadalupe, prayed for the liberation of Hungary.

¹ Address made at Michigan State University, East Lansing, Mich., on Feb. 2 (press release 47 dated Jan. 31).

I should like to recall also a story—which is not told nearly often enough—about successful Mexican-United States cooperation in repelling aggression against the hemisphere. It happened almost a century ago. The course of history, not only our history and Mexico's but that of the world, might have been changed if Mexican statesmanship and United States statesmanship had not then united to keep the hemisphere free.

The year was 1864, the season early spring, and freedom was threatened on many fronts. In our own country, terribly torn by civil war, General Grant was hurriedly reorganizing his armies. In Paris, Napoleon III was making no secret of his project of a Mexican empire for Maximilian. In London, Maximilian was being received incognito by Queen Victoria. In Mexico, the young nation was confronted by European determination to end its independence.

Our Secretary of State was William H. Seward. He was faced by this threat of European monarchical aggression against Mexico while we ourselves were tragically involved in fratricidal war at home. The Secretary carried out his officially neutral role as between Mexico and France, even while Napoleon III was telling the world about the potentialities of Maximilian's forthcoming empire. It was an hour of crisis when Mexico and the United States had to plan and to act together. To frustrate that last attempt by a European power at establishing an empire in this hemisphere was the joint objective of Seward and the youthful Mexican Minister to the United States, Matías Romero. In this they had the tremendous support of public opinion. At a dinner at Delmonico's in New York held by influential private citizens in support of the Mexican position, William E. Dodge, Jr., declared that "when our own civil war shall be over, there will not be a city, nor a town, nor a village which will not immediately arm a company of soldiers to fly to the aid of our sister republic, now making so glorious a fight."

Romero responded with deep emotion that while, true enough, Mexicans had once believed the United States was chiefly concerned with enlarging its own territorial areas, now a new era had dawned. "Our common interest, political as well as commercial," he said, "will give us a common continental policy which no European nation would dare disregard." The relation of how Romero and Seward worked tirelessly and effectively

together is a fundamental hemisphere document. Seward described their success as "creation of mutual moral alliance to the end that all external aggression may be prevented throughout the whole continent."

Suggestions have been made from time to time that in the historical series of United States postage stamps one group should be devoted to Latin American and United States citizens who have worked together in close inter-American solidarity. When such a series is designed, I hope that, along with the collaboration of Bolívar and Henry Clay, the mutual contributions to educational progress of Sarmiento and Horace Mann, the association in New York of Marti and Dana, there will be a portrayal also of this memorable, fundamental defense of hemisphere freedom by the brilliant young Mexican diplomat and our farseeing, hard-pressed Secretary of State.

Of course, in referring to United States-Mexican relations, we in all honesty should consider the totality of our relationships. If we could draw up a balance sheet, the credit side of the ledger would show a tremendous advantage over the debit side. However, the very existence of a debit side, of a negative aspect of our relations, of problems unsolved, if you please, constitutes the greatest challenge to wholehearted cooperation which our two countries can have. We both need to work unceasingly to solve those problems that still confront us, to add to that enormous depository of good will which already has made a model of our neighborly relationships.

Economic Relations

To examine in some detail the economic side of our relations with Mexico, I might go back to the early days of World War II. In 1941 the United States agreed to lend Mexico \$40 million for highway construction, including completion of the Mexican section of the Inter-American Highway, as well as for building and expanding factories for steel. A later loan was for other strategic materials needed in the war effort. As one of the Allied forces in World War II, Mexico made invaluable contributions of such materials.

The Mexican-American Commission for Economic Cooperation was established in 1943. It strengthened our cooperation in World War II and was a strong factor in the hemisphere's successful resistance to aggression.

In recent years constructive economic coopera-

tion with Mexico has increased progressively. For instance, there are the series of loans made by the Export-Import Bank for a wide variety of purposes, including railroad rehabilitation and construction; development and expansion of steel, sugar, sulphur, and mining industries; and electrification. During the past 7 years these Export-Import Bank loans to Mexico total \$231,766,000. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has also granted loans to Mexico of \$141 million during the same period "for power development and railroad rehabilitation." These figures attest to Mexico's excellent credit standing.

Foreign investment in Mexico advanced steadily last year over the 1955 total of \$112 million. United States investors made up more than 70 percent of the total. Among new United States industrial enterprises in 1956 were the Ralston Premium factory for cattle feed in Queretaro and the John Deere plant in Nuevo León for manufacturing and assembling tractors and farm implements.

Comercio Internacional, official organ of the National Association of Importers and Exporters of Mexico, recently published a summary of United States business enterprises now operating in that country. One interesting fact brought to light is that, out of 46 such enterprises, half were owned jointly by Mexican and United States citizens, the Mexicans in several cases holding the controlling interest. Furthermore, 22 of the companies consistently reinvest 100 percent of their net profits in Mexico, and an additional 9 reinvest in Mexico more than half the net profits. The survey concluded that the average Mexican citizen receives the following benefits from United States private investment in Mexico:

1. Employment opportunities. Of the 53,000 workers in the 46 enterprises, 52,200 are Mexicans.
2. Opportunities for high-level executive experience. Of the 978 executive and managerial positions in these companies, 746 are occupied by Mexicans. In some, Mexicans hold all the top jobs.
3. Good wages.
4. Excellent technical training. The survey reports that through these companies "there is evolving in Mexico a skilled labor force which is already the equal of any other in Latin America and superior to most."
5. Availability of up-to-date United States

technology, along with discoveries and improvements worked out in research laboratories of industries with Mexican plants.

At the present time, direct United States investments in Mexico exceed \$600 million. After Governor G. Mennen Williams' recent visit to Latin America, he pointed out that "some United States businessmen are serving as ambassadors of good will while making a good profit. They are providing much-needed technical know-how and helping to build solid and democratic States."

As regards our total trade, Mexico is both one of our indispensable sources of supply and one of our best customers—our largest customer in Latin America, in fact, and our third largest in the world. In 1956 Mexico bought approximately \$804 million of United States products, 15 percent more than in 1955.

Fifty percent of Mexican exports are sent to the United States; 80 percent of Mexican imports come from the United States. Imports—largely investment goods for industrial and agricultural development projects—were somewhat in excess of exports during 1956. (The figures, from January through September, were: exports, \$620 million; imports, \$789 million.) However, this deficit was more than offset by a number of factors: increased private investment, both domestic and foreign; large tourist receipts; gold and silver production; and remittances from short-term agricultural laborers in the United States. As regards the last category, the agricultural laborers, it is my information that at the peak period last August, right here in Michigan, which is a long way from the Mexican border, you had some 10,500 of these Mexican workers helping to harvest your sugar beets and raw crops and to pick your cherries.

At the end of December 1955, Mexican gold and dollar reserves amounted to \$410 million. At the end of 1956, Mexico's foreign-exchange reserves were around \$460 million, according to the Mexican Finance Minister.

In his recent end-of-the-year message to the nation, President Ruiz Cortines provided an accelerated program for Mexico in 1957.

"We can see what 25 years of internal peace have achieved," he said, and forecast a great public works program for the current year: intensification of road building; irrigation in agricultural zones; construction of schools, hospitals, and

grain elevators—these last to expand production by affording much-needed storage facilities.

The country's present economic condition justifies the Mexican Government's optimistic forecasts for the present year. There have been 3 successive years of good harvests, in spite of drought in some areas. Mineral, agricultural, and industrial production has been rising steadily. Mexico's gross national production in 1956 reached approximately 100 billion pesos (\$8 billion), an increase of 10 percent over the 1955 gross of 84 billion pesos (\$6.7 billion).

The Mexican Government's optimism is reflected in the generally buoyant attitude of the Mexican people regarding their economic future. Both Government and people have contributed to the improved status by exercising intelligence and self-discipline. For example, Mexico is not sitting back to enjoy present prosperity but using the gains to increase national productive capacity. Inflationary tendencies, not long since a serious menace, appear to be under control.

There are some long-range problems, such as the shortage of new arable lands that can be brought into production by irrigation. However, the Mexican Government and people have proved their ability to cope successfully with such difficulties.

"People to People" Contacts

It may surprise you to hear that some 35,000 United States citizens make their home in Mexico. Similarly, thousands of Mexican citizens reside in this country. Nor should we forget that many families, especially in California, Florida, Louisiana, and the States along the Rio Grande are of Mexican ancestry and keep in touch with their Mexican relatives. Valuable "people to people" contacts are maintained also through the half-million or more United States citizens who visit Mexico annually, crossing the border every month of the year in friendly multitudes. They come home with increased understanding and admiration for that hospitable land and its people, to whose economy they add by spending there some \$250 million a year.

No less important is a parallel flow of Mexican citizens to the United States. In fact, their number is even greater, since, in addition to the thousands of Mexicans who come to this country as tourists and for professional and business rea-

sons, numerous agricultural laborers arrive to work under temporary contracts. In this group of workers alone, more than 400,000 came during 1956. Let me say in this connection that the difficult problems arising from illegal entry of many such workers are being satisfactorily resolved by both Governments.

An extremely important category in this large-scale exchange of persons, to employ awkward but useful official terminology, is that of university students. Hundreds of young Mexicans are studying in United States colleges and universities—many of them, as you are well aware, have come to East Lansing and Ann Arbor—and hundreds of our own young people, especially under the GI Bill of Rights, have been enrolled in Mexican institutions of learning. As a matter of record, an exchange of notes between our two Governments in 1949 established the United States-Mexican Cultural Commission. In the words of our Ambassador, the primary purpose is "to create even better understanding between the United States and Mexico . . . through the free interchanges of ideas, knowledge, and information about each other's way of living and thinking."

That cultural agreement with Mexico was the first which the United States had ever signed with any country. There was an especial fitness that it should have been with our neighbor, Mexico. The first printing press in this hemisphere was at Mexico City, which published the first book in 1537. A school with more than a thousand students had been established 15 years earlier; and in 1553 the University of Mexico—now housed in one of the most modern and beautiful physical plants in the world—was officially opened. In his scholarly and delightful work titled *Books of the Brave*, Dr. Irving A. Leonard, a distinguished member of the faculty of the University of Michigan, tells us that by 1605, when the first edition of *Don Quixote* appeared, Spanish books were arriving regularly at Mexico in considerable quantities and there were several sizable private libraries. One of these included, in addition to a wide assortment of literary, theological, and scientific works, numerous maps, woodcuts, drawings, and astrolabes and other scientific instruments.

Our own unofficial cultural relations with Mexico began in colonial times. Benjamin Franklin

took a special interest in encouraging inter-American scientific contacts, and Latin American scientists showed responsive enthusiasm. In 1789 and 1790 the Mexican astronomer José Alzate wrote extensive commentaries on Franklin's experiments with electricity and translated material by Franklin on optics, rays, and waves. An early New York scientist, Dr. Samuel Latham Mitchell, who worked cooperatively with Mexicans in his field, said of Mexico that its public spirit had been "manifested in the endowments of learned institutions and in the encouragement of scientific man to an extent of which no parallel exists in our state of society." In keeping with this cordial recognition, Mexican friends of science made various important contributions of books and mineral specimens to the American Philosophical Society, which Benjamin Franklin had founded and zealously cherished.

Ever since, as I have indicated already, United States-Mexican cooperation has been operating at many levels and through innumerable media, both public and private. Take, for example, the diversified agricultural program inaugurated in Mexico in 1943 by the Rockefeller Foundation. It includes research into the production of wheat, beans, potatoes, truck crops, sorghum, soy beans, grasses, poultry, and, most important of all, that basic Mexican crop—corn. Under this program corn production has been increasing steadily for the past decade. The main food crop in Mexico since the time of the Aztecs has been corn, and that country is now able to meet the needs of her own increasing population.

The story of the Mexican-American Commission for the Eradication of Foot-and-Mouth Disease demonstrates the great, even tragic, difficulties which cooperation sometimes involves. The Commission in 1947 undertook the vital task of eliminating all cattle with foot-and-mouth disease in Mexican ranchlands, and of vaccinating the rest. The project met with opposition—sometimes extremely violent—from country people who regarded its personnel merely as hostile "cow-killers."

On most small Mexican farms in a large part of the infected area, farm draft power was furnished by oxen. Killing the cattle, including the oxen, on these farms paralyzed virtually all farm production. Furthermore, cattle provide the principal source of income from large areas of rough,

mountainous farmland in Mexico. Finally, the Joint Commission was forced to develop a method of eradication of foot-and-mouth disease by inoculating susceptible animals—cattle, sheep, goats, and hogs—every 4 or 5 months until no further infection appeared. But no more exposed animals were slaughtered. In some areas efforts to carry out the campaign had met with armed resistance, which made the final success all the more remarkable. That success was achieved by the joint labor of both Governments, and, in particular, by the devotion of the Commission personnel, Mexican and United States, during 5 years of working shoulder to shoulder under trying and difficult conditions.

Falcón Dam

A unique and enduring monument to Mexican-United States cooperation and friendship is the mighty Falcón Dam. Planned, constructed, and built by the two Governments on the Rio Grande, 75 miles downstream from Laredo, there has been no other intergovernmental project in history quite like it. As President Eisenhower said in his dedicatory address October 19, 1953:

More than a mute monument to the ingenuity of engineers, this Falcón Dam is living testimony to the understanding and the cooperation binding our two peoples. . . .

This work is one of the most dramatic achievements of the International Boundary and Water Commission, which conceived and executed its construction. . . . It has given the world a lesson in the way neighbor nations . . . should live: in peace, in mutual respect, in common prosperity.²

And President Ruíz Cortines said in response:

Thousands of families on these lands scorched by the droughts of centuries will see the fruit of their labors multiplied. Electric power will replace muscle power. The lifegiving and indispensable waters, now under control, will make the sown fields fertile. Falcón Dam symbolizes in a most special way the desire of our two countries to unite their efforts in this sphere of cooperation which their neighborhood makes imperative; to facilitate—and, if possible, to accelerate—the forward march of social and economic progress.

Mexico is opening many new channels of communication through its great roadbuilding program. I have already referred to the Inter-American Highway, which, as you know, will be

² BULLETIN of Nov. 2, 1953, p. 579.

completed soon. The Mexican section, 1,601 miles long, extending from Texas to Guatemala, efficiently built, paid for, and maintained by Mexico, was inaugurated in 1950. Present road construction responds to the rapid increase in population. The Mexican rate, between 2½ and 3 percent annually, is one of the highest in the world and makes necessary a corresponding increase in means of communication. Among the more important of these is the new north-south route from Piedra Negras, just across the river from Eagle Pass, Texas, to Mexico City, which is due for completion this year.

Last September Mexico inaugurated a multi-million dollar, 5-year campaign to wipe out malaria, which in some regions of the country has been practically endemic for generations. While some 700,000 dwellings receive residual spraying against mosquitoes, victims of the disease will be treated, with results surveyed and evaluated. Since malaria is a global problem, made more so in the air age, the results of this campaign are of international interest. It is accordingly fitting that it should be, as it is, an international cooperative project. Mexico makes what is by far the chief financial contribution, aided by the United Nations Children's Fund and the World Health Organization; while our own ICA, the United States International Cooperation Administration, gives some consultative assistance.

Another example of the way in which we are cooperating successfully in working things out is the radio broadcasting agreement between the United States and Mexico signed just a few days ago, on January 29. During the past 8 years concerted efforts had been made to settle the complex broadcasting problems between our countries. Technical representatives of our two Governments held numerous conferences on the subject. Representatives of both Mexican and United States broadcasting industries also took part in these conferences. The mutual desire of these industrial representatives for rules which would regulate and control the industry was instrumental in bringing about the final agreement.

Both Mexico and the United States are constitutional democracies, whose peoples find in a republican form of government the greatest safeguard of their freedoms and the greatest promise for their future. Mutuality of interests no less

than geographical propinquity will undoubtedly increase the methods and objectives of cooperation for our common benefit.

As both our nations continue to grow, Mexico and the United States will undoubtedly extend existing cooperation through our regional grouping in the Organization of American States, our global association in the United Nations, and our bilateral agreements with each other.

For both countries, increasing population, expanding development of natural resources, and enlarging industrial potential will afford myriad new opportunities for cooperation—economically, politically, and culturally. I have no doubt that our Governments and our peoples alike will welcome these opportunities and will make the most of them in benefit of our two nations and of mankind.

Just over a half century ago, in 1906, Elihu Root told the Pan American Conference at Rio de Janeiro:

We wish to increase our prosperity, to expand our trade, to grow in wealth, in wisdom, and in spirit; but one conception of the true way to accomplish this is not to pull down others and profit by their ruin but to help all friends to a common prosperity and a common growth, that we may all become greater and stronger together.

That expression of our own country's attitude was enhanced and reaffirmed for the 21 American Republics on March 6, 1945, at Chapultepec, with the declaration that "the inter-American community is dedicated to the ideals of peaceful cooperation." I should like to close—and look forward—with that affirmation.

Eximbank Loan to Honduras for Inter-American Highway

A loan of \$1,650,000 to Honduras to assist in completion of the Inter-American Highway across that country between the borders of Nicaragua and El Salvador was announced on February 5 by the Export-Import Bank of Washington.

This is the third recent loan by the Export-Import Bank to a Central American Republic to accelerate progress on the Inter-American Highway. EXIMBANK loaned \$9,540,000 to Costa Rica for this purpose in 1955 and \$2,000,000 to Nicaragua in 1956.

Existing administrative arrangements provide that the Government of Honduras will disburse

loan funds under the supervision and fiscal control of the U.S. Bureau of Public Roads for construction, engineering, and incidental costs on three sections of highway totaling 94 miles. Work to be done consists largely of grading, constructing bridges, and providing asphalt surfacing.

The U.S. Bureau of Public Roads is supervising construction programs along the highway in other Central American Republics under similar arrangements.

In Honduras the highway runs along the south coast beginning, at its westerly point, at El Amatillo on the El Salvador border and extending to El Espino on the Nicaraguan border. The highway passes through Jicaro Galan, junction for Tegucigalpa, capital of Honduras, located 117 kilometers or 73 miles to the north, then through San Lorenzo, Chohulteca, Chinchayote, San Marcos, and to El Espino.

Major traffic movement expected to be developed by completion of the highway will be through traffic from El Salvador and Nicaragua. Improvement of this highway is expected to stimulate increased agricultural production, especially such foodstuffs as corn and beans. The movement of products over the section from Jicaro Galan to El Amatillo is expected to result in an increased exchange of goods between Honduras and El Salvador. Products, in addition to foodstuffs, will be general merchandise.

Passenger traffic is also expected to increase as a consequence of the improvements being made in the southern highway that connects Tegucigalpa with the Inter-American Highway.

Terms provide that the loan shall be repaid in 30 approximately equal semiannual installments commencing not later than February 1, 1960.

Tax Convention With Honduras Enters Into Force

Press release 59 dated February 8

On February 6, 1957, the income tax convention between the United States and Honduras signed at Washington on June 25, 1956,¹ was brought into force by the exchange of instruments of ratification. The exchange took place at Tegucigalpa.

¹ BULLETIN of July 9, 1956, p. 68. For text, see S. Exec. K, 84th Cong., 2d sess.

The convention for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income is effective retroactively beginning January 1, 1957. It is the first such convention to be concluded with any of the American Republics. Its provisions follow, in general, the pattern of income tax conventions in force between the United States and numerous other countries.

The convention is designed, by eliminating as far as possible double taxation on the same income, to remove an undesirable impediment to international trade, investment, and economic development. It applies, so far as U.S. taxes are concerned, only to the Federal income taxes, including surtaxes. It does not apply to the imposition or collection of taxes by the several States, the District of Columbia, or the territories or possessions of the United States, except that it contains a broad national-treatment provision similar to a provision customarily found in treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation.

Agreement With Brazil Concerning Guided Missiles Facility

The United States and Brazil on January 21 concluded an agreement for the establishment of a guided missiles facility on the Island of Fernando de Noronha. The agreement was effected by an exchange of notes at Rio de Janeiro between U.S. Ambassador Ellis C. Briggs and José Carlos de Macedo Soares, Brazilian Minister for Foreign Affairs. Following is the text of the U.S. note.

RIO DE JANEIRO,
January 21, 1957

No. 146

EXCELLENCY:

I have the honor to acknowledge Your Excellency's Note No. DPo/11/520.5 of today's date, the text of which in English is as follows:

The Government of the United States of Brazil, conscious of the obligations which devolve upon it and which extend equally to the Government of the United States of America, with reference to the common defense of the two countries and the defense of the Continent, by reason of diplomatic undertakings previously concluded, especially the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed in Rio de Janeiro on September 2, 1947, as reaffirmed by the Military Assistance Agreement concluded in this capital by the two Governments on March 15, 1952, both duly approved by the Legislative Power of Brazil, is prepared to conclude the following Agreement which

follows in particular Article I, Paragraph 1, *in fine*, of the Agreement mentioned:

(1) The Governments of Brazil and of the United States of America, with a view to the defense of Brazilian territory and of the American Continent, have agreed to the construction on the Island of Fernando de Noronha of installations particularly of an electronic character connected with the tracking of guided missiles.

(2) These installations shall be constructed by United States specialists and technicians assisted by Brazilian specialists and technicians.

(3) The said installations shall be under the command of a Brazilian officer and the Brazilian national flag exclusively shall continue to fly over the Island of Fernando de Noronha.

(4) The operation of the said technical installations shall be under the responsibility of United States technicians assisted by Brazilian technicians and military.

(5) The Governments of Brazil and of the United States of America agree that United States technicians shall be gradually replaced by Brazilian technicians in accordance with conditions to be determined by common agreement.

(6) The Government of the United States of America, in view of the fact that the Government of Brazil considers its responsibilities increased by the establishment of the guided missile tracking station on the island of Fernando de Noronha, agrees to undertake immediately with the Brazilian Government an examination of the extent of the responsibilities that may be involved.

(7) The construction and fixed improvements made on the Island of Fernando de Noronha in connection with the technical installations to which this Agreement refers shall become the property of Brazil without any indemnification, upon termination of this Agreement or upon termination of any extension.

(8) It is understood that this Note and Your Excellency's reply thereto shall constitute an Agreement between our two Governments which shall remain in force for a period of five years from this date and may be extended only under the conditions and for the length of time to be determined by common agreement. In the event of an extension, the Agreement may be denounced by either of the two Governments with prior notice of one year.

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the United States of America confirms this Agreement.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

ELLIS O. BRIGGS,
American Ambassador

License Regulations Eased On Exports of Technical Data

Simplification of regulations covering scientific, educational, and other types of unclassified technical data exportable under general license to all foreign destinations, without the necessity of applying for an individual license, were announced on January 31 by the Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of Commerce. Exporters of certain technical data need no longer indicate on the letter or parcel the general license authorization under which the export is made, if the shipment is noncommercial and is being exported via first-class mail.

This amendment of the regulations applies only to noncommercial shipments such as those made by a private person not engaged in business, by a philanthropic organization, or by a nonprofit scientific society, and only to those shipments authorized under general license GTDS (scientific or educational data) or GTDP (published technical data). Previously, exporters of such data were required to place the applicable general license symbol and the phrase "Export License Not Required" on the wrapper of the parcel.

The Bureau of Foreign Commerce has also revised its regulations to permit U.S. Government agencies to export technical data under general license GTDS without placing the required authorization on the package. Previously this requirement had been eliminated for Government agencies only for shipments under GTDP.

The amendments are designed to facilitate exchange of unclassified scientific and technical information. The previous requirement had been misunderstood by many persons to mean that the Government exercised censorship over such communications. This is not the case, the Bureau said, and the change in regulations should serve to give emphasis to this fact.¹

¹ These revisions are published in detail in Current Export Bulletin 779, dated Jan. 31. The bulletin may be obtained from the Department of Commerce, Washington 25, D. C., or from any of the Department's field offices at 10 cents a copy.

The 1956 International Wheat Agreement

by L. I. Highby

The International Wheat Agreement of 1956, which was negotiated by the United Nations Wheat Conference in sessions held in late 1955 and early 1956 at Geneva and London, entered into force in direct succession to the similar 1953 agreement, which expired July 31, 1956. Forty-five countries, including the United States, have now formally accepted the new agreement.

The message of the President to the Senate of June 12, 1956,¹ requesting the advice and consent of that body to ratification set forth the circumstances of the negotiation and the character and extent of the rights and obligations of member countries. It also contained a summary of the principal provisions of the new agreement, indicating the most important changes from the predecessor agreement. The present article is intended to account for subsequent developments in connection with formal acceptance of the agreement and the organization of the new International Wheat Council. It also shows the role played in international trade in wheat by the 1949 and 1953 International Wheat Agreements, which were in operation in the 7 years preceding entry into force of the present agreement.²

Senate Hearings on Wheat Agreement

At a hearing held on the wheat agreement before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on July 3, 1956, testimony was given by representatives of the Departments of Agriculture and State. The Department of Agriculture,

● Mr. Highby is an international economist, Office of International Trade and Resources.

in a formal statement presented for the record, brought out the fact that, in view of the high level of world wheat stocks and the unwillingness of the exporting countries to make any important concessions on price as from the 1953 agreement, "the ultimate success of the Wheat Agreement negotiation would seem to represent a signal manifestation of the widespread belief among nations in the principle, and value, of international cooperation in the world marketing of wheat." Consultation held by the Department of Agriculture with agricultural groups advisory to the Government, with farm organizations, with wheat growers, and with wheat and flour export trade associations in the United States had also indicated widespread support for the continuation under present conditions of world supply of this type of cooperation. It was explained that the relatively modest quantity of 303 million bushels, as compared with 396 million covered in the 1953 agreement and a still larger quantity in the 1949 agreement, was due to the continued nonparticipation of the United Kingdom and the reluctance of other importing countries to commit sizable quantities under the terms of the agreement in view of the current abundance of supplies of wheat. The share of the United States as entered in the new agreement thus became about 132 million bushels as compared with 196 million under the previous agreement. The statement by the Department of Agriculture pointed out, however, that this was "more in line with actual United States sales under the agreement, which in 1954-1955 were 130 million bushels, and which are estimated for 1955-1956 at 132 million."

¹ BULLETIN of July 2, 1956, p. 26.

² For an article on the 1949 agreement, see *ibid.*, Apr. 24, 1949, p. 507.

The Department of Agriculture testimony also brought out that, while the projected membership of importing countries was almost the same as in the 1953 agreement, the prospect that Argentina and Sweden might be added to the exporter members "goes a long way toward compensating for the smaller quantities in the agreement, for although the agreement total represents only about 31 percent of world trade in wheat, yet the 6 exporting member countries export inside and outside the agreement 90 percent of all wheat moving in world trade. It is not unreasonable to suppose that these exporting countries may coordinate their selling policies outside the agreement with those under the agreement to a degree which would exert considerable influence on the entire 90 percent of world wheat trade." It was also brought out that the Argentine representative at the conference had given reason to expect that his Government would effect changes in its trade policy which would result in bringing additional quantities under the wheat agreement.

In accounting to the committee for the cost of the 1953 wheat agreement which was about to terminate, the statement of the Department of Agriculture included the following:

In September 1953—the second month of the current 3-year agreement—world prices of wheat outside the agreement fell below the agreement maximum price. Naturally prices under the agreement declined likewise, since trade is obtained by competition within the agreement price range just as it would be obtained competitively outside the agreement. Since the agreement maximum price ceased to operate as a ceiling for selling prices and the IWA selling prices and other world prices were at the same level, one viewpoint might be that the implementation of membership in the Wheat Agreement insofar as export payments themselves are concerned resulted in no additional cost to the United States. This is not to say that the funds appropriated by the Congress to defray the payment of 66½ cents per bushel do not represent very real costs to the Government, but the point here is that there would have been involved a similar cost in accomplishing the exportation of the same quantity of wheat in the absence of a wheat agreement—prevailing domestic market prices and prices in world competition being what they were. There is considerable justification for the further viewpoint that, in the absence of price stability afforded by the agreement, the selling prices of wheat in world markets might well have gone much lower with corresponding increase in the cost of United States export payment necessary to sustain exports.

Agriculture's testimony also referred to the new provision in the 1956 agreement (paragraph 7 (a), article XIII) which made it permissive for the

Wheat Council to study any aspect of the world wheat situation and to sponsor exchanges of information and intergovernmental consultations relating thereto. In discussion at the hearing it was clearly brought out that this provision did not open any possibility of interference or dictation by the Wheat Council concerning the domestic policies of member countries, since it is immediately followed in the agreement itself by a statement of reservation by the member countries of "complete liberty of action in the determination and administration of their internal agricultural and price policies."

The Department of Agriculture's statement summarized reasons for commending the agreement for Senate approval as follows:

1. The prospect that the agreement may for the first time include all the major world exporters of wheat except Turkey and Uruguay.

2. The degree of stability afforded by the price range, and the psychological effect thereof on the prices of all wheat in world trade.

3. The agreement provides a useful point of contact between the United States and importing countries which are potential buyers of United States wheat.

4. The agreement provides a natural and continuing point of contact between the United States and other major exporting countries, which is of particular value in view of other United States disposal programs and their effect upon international relations, and the need for maintaining understanding and equilibrium.

5. The agreement affords an internationally accepted structure within which the United States may operate its export subsidy program on wheat and flour.

6. Continuation of the agreement has strong support in farm organizations and industry and other agricultural advisory groups.

The testimonial statement presented by the Department of State contained the following:

It is clear that our interests are best served by working with friendly countries in this matter. It is also clear that such cooperation is most effective and most acceptable if pursued on a multilateral basis with participation of both exporting and importing countries. . . . The Department of State considers the agreement in the best interest of the United States since it offers a guaranty of an important export outlet for wheat at a given price and can serve to stabilize wheat prices generally in international trade, thus avoiding unnecessary hazards in the field of our foreign economic relations.

U.S. Ratification

The Committee on Foreign Relations reported the agreement favorably on July 5, unanimously recommending that the Senate give its advice and

consent to ratification. On July 10 the Senate agreed to ratification with only one dissenting vote. A formal instrument of ratification was thereupon signed by the President and deposited on July 13 with the Department of State, which acts as depositary for the agreement.

Membership and Guaranteed Quantities Listed in the Agreement as Negotiated

The importer membership and the guaranteed purchases for each crop year as projected in the negotiated agreement (annex A to article III) were as follows:

ANNEX A TO ARTICLE III
GUARANTEED PURCHASES FOR EACH CROP-YEAR

	<i>Metric tons</i>	<i>Equiv. in bushels</i>
Austria	100,000	3,674,371
Belgium	450,000	16,534,669
Bolivia	110,000	4,041,808
Brazil	200,000	7,348,742
Ceylon	175,000	6,430,149
Colombia	70,000	2,572,060
Costa Rica	40,000	1,469,748
Cuba	202,000	7,422,229
Denmark	50,000	1,837,185
Dominican Republic	30,000	1,102,311
Ecuador	50,000	1,837,185
Egypt	300,000	11,023,113
El Salvador	25,000	918,593
Germany	1,500,000	55,115,565
Greece	300,000	11,023,113
Guatemala	40,000	1,469,748
Haiti	60,000	2,204,623
Honduras	25,000	918,593
India	200,000	7,348,742
Indonesia	140,000	5,144,119
Ireland	150,000	5,511,557
Israel	225,000	8,267,335
Italy	100,000	3,674,371
Japan	1,000,000	36,743,710
Jordan	10,000	367,437
Korea	60,000	2,204,623
Lebanon	75,000	2,755,778
Liberia	2,000	73,487
Mexico	100,000	3,674,371
Netherlands	700,000	25,720,597
New Zealand	160,000	5,878,994
Nicaragua	10,000	367,437
Norway	180,000	6,613,868
Panama	30,000	1,102,311
Peru	200,000	7,348,742
Philippines	165,000	6,062,712
Portugal	160,000	5,878,994
Saudi Arabia	100,000	3,674,371
Spain	125,000	4,592,964
Switzerland	190,000	6,981,305
Union of South Africa	150,000	5,511,557
Vatican City	15,000	551,156
Venezuela	170,000	6,246,431
Yugoslavia	100,000	3,674,371
Totals	8,244,000	302,915,145

The exporter membership and the guaranteed sales as projected in the agreement (annex B to article III) were as follows:

ANNEX B TO ARTICLE III
GUARANTEED SALES FOR EACH CROP-YEAR

	<i>Metric tons</i>	<i>Equiv. in bushels</i>
Argentina	400,000	14,697,484
Australia	823,471	30,257,380
Canada	2,800,395	102,896,902
France	450,000	16,534,669
Sweden	175,000	6,430,149
United States	3,595,134	1,132,098,561
Totals	8,244,000	302,915,145

In the above list the shares of the three main exporting countries—Australia, Canada, and the United States—are in the same proportion to each other as in the 1953 agreement. The shares of the new participants—Argentina and Sweden—and of France, which had only a nominal quantity in the 1953 agreement, are related to quantities importing countries were prepared to cover by increases in their guaranteed purchases over and above what they were prepared to commit in an agreement with exporter membership limited to Australia, Canada, and the United States.

Entry Into Force

As was stated in the President's message to the Senate, article XX, paragraph 2, of the agreement provided that instruments of acceptance should be deposited by signatory governments with the Government of the United States not later than July 16, provided, however, that a notification by a signatory government by that date of its intention to accept the agreement, followed by the deposit of an instrument of acceptance not later than December 1, 1956, in fulfillment of that intention, should be deemed to constitute acceptance on July 16. Article XX, paragraph 3, required that such acceptances by countries listed in the agreement (annexes to article III) by July 16 should account for two-thirds of the guaranteed sales and two-thirds of the guaranteed purchases entered in the agreement in order to bring it into force as of that date with respect to its administrative sections (parts 1, 3, 4, and 5) and by August 1 with respect to its rights and obligations (part 2).

Ten of the importing countries listed in the document (Ceylon, Colombia, Cuba, Haiti, Honduras, Indonesia, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, and Venezuela) had not signed the document in the period when it was open for signature up to May 18. These countries were not qualified to

accept the agreement under article XX but would be able to apply for accession under article XXI. Review of the status of acceptances as reported by the Department of State showed that all six exporting countries had accepted under the terms of article XX, thus accounting for 100 percent of the guaranteed sales listed in the agreement (8,244,000 metric tons). Thirty-two of the thirty-four signatory importers had likewise accepted; they accounted for 6,857,000 tons, or over 83 percent of the total of guaranteed purchases. Most of the countries which accepted, lacking time in the short period which had elapsed since the signing to complete procedures for formal acceptance, accepted, as provided in the agreement, by submission to the Department of State of notes indicating intention to accept, to be followed by an instrument of acceptance by December 1.

The conference thereupon announced that the agreement entered into force as to the organizational and administrative sections (parts 1, 3, 4, and 5) on July 16 and as to rights and obligations (part 2) on August 1. Thereupon, the meeting constituted itself the 20th session of the International Wheat Council in accordance with paragraph 1 of article XIII of the agreement, which provides:

The International Wheat Council established by the International Wheat Agreement, which was opened for signature in Washington on 23 March 1949, shall continue in being for the purpose of administering the present Agreement.

The assets of the Wheat Council which operated under the 1953 agreement had been conveyed by action of that body in its final session on July 16 to the Council which would operate under the new agreement.

The Council, acting under paragraph 5 of article XX, extended the time for deposit of instruments of acceptance until December 1 for two of the signatory importing countries, Ireland and New Zealand, which had not taken action to accept the agreement as provided in paragraph 2 of article XX.

The application for accession of two of the ten importing countries listed in the agreement which had not become signatories, namely, Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, were accepted under article XXI subject to deposit of an instrument of accession by December 1. It was agreed that the other eight which had failed to sign might apply and be accepted on the basis in each case of the

quantity listed for it in the agreement and subject to deposit of an instrument of accession by December 1. The Council further accepted under article XXI—subject to deposit of an instrument of accession by December 1—the application for accession of Iceland, which had not been included in the agreement document, with a quantity of 2,000 tons.

Application of provisions in the agreement (article IX) to adjust the guaranteed sales of exporting countries to the total of the guaranteed purchases of importing countries was postponed until the next meeting of the Council, to be held in early December.

Organization of the Council

Membership of the Executive Committee for the 1956-57 agreement year was constituted as follows:

4 exporting countries: Argentina, Australia, Canada, the United States.

8 importing countries: Benelux, Brazil, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Portugal, Union of South Africa.

Delegation of powers to the Executive Committee and adoption of rules of procedure followed closely the pattern established under the previous agreement.

F. Sheed Anderson of the United Kingdom was continued as chairman of the Council with authority of chief executive officer, and Sir Edwin McCarthy as vice chairman. They were also again elected as chairman and vice chairman, respectively, of the Executive Committee.

The seat of the Council continues to be London but is subject to change, according to the agreement, if the Council so decides by concurrent majority vote of exporting and importing countries.

Status of Acceptances as of December 1, 1956

At its 21st session, convened on December 4, 1956, the Wheat Council reviewed the status of instruments of formal acceptance deposited with the United States Government by December 1.³ The six signatory exporting countries had deposited instruments of acceptance, thus accounting for the total of guaranteed sales (8,244,000 metric tons) listed in the agreement. Thirty of the

³ For a Department announcement concerning the status of acceptances, see *ibid.*, Jan. 7, 1957, p. 41.

thirty-four signatory importing countries had deposited instruments of acceptance accounting for over 75 percent (6,162,000 metric tons) of the guaranteed purchases under the agreement. In addition, seven of the 10 importing countries listed in the agreement which failed to sign in the prescribed period had applied to accede, had been accepted, and had deposited instruments of accession. These accounted together for an additional quantity of 822,000 metric tons. Thus, importing countries listed in the agreement which had fully accepted accounted for nearly 85 percent of the guaranteed purchases entered therein. In addition, an importing country not listed in the agreement, Iceland, had deposited an instrument of acceptance with a quantity of 2,000 tons.

The four signatory importing countries which had not deposited instruments of acceptance by December 1 indicated intention to complete procedures for depositing instruments of acceptance and were granted an extension of time until March 31 for this purpose. Since this group of countries accounts for 1,005,000 metric tons, the total of guaranteed purchases is prospectively 7,991,000 metric tons or about 97 percent of the total listed in the agreement. The countries and their quantities are listed at the right.

Since guaranteed sales exceeded guaranteed purchases, the Wheat Council, acting under article IX, reduced pro rata the quantities of the exporting countries in order to effect a balance. The resulting distribution was as follows:

	Metric tons
Argentina	387,725,000
Australia	798,200,000
Canada	2,714,453,000
France	436,190,000
Sweden	169,630,000
United States	3,484,802,000
	<hr/> 7,991,000

Shortly after the 21st session of the Wheat Council, Panama deposited its instrument of acceptance. This brings present membership of importing countries to 39 and total membership to 45. The expected formal acceptance of the three remaining signatories will bring membership to 48 as compared with 50 listed in the negotiated document.

Similarities to 1949 and 1953 Agreements

The International Wheat Agreement of 1956 is in direct descent from the agreements negotiated

Importing Countries Listed in the Agreement Which Had Deposited Instruments of Acceptance or Accession by December 1

	Metric tons
Austria	100,000
Belgium	450,000
Bolivia	110,000
Costa Rica	40,000
Cuba	202,000
Denmark	50,000
Dominican Republic	30,000
Ecuador	50,000
Egypt	300,000
El Salvador	25,000
Germany	1,500,000
Greece	300,000
Guatemala	40,000
Haiti	60,000
Honduras	25,000
India	200,000
Indonesia	140,000
Ireland	150,000
Israel	225,000
Italy	100,000
Japan	1,000,000
Korea	60,000
Liberia	2,000
Mexico	100,000
New Zealand	160,000
Nicaragua	10,000
Norway	180,000
Peru	200,000
Philippines	165,000
Portugal	160,000
Saudi Arabia	100,000
Spain	125,000
Switzerland	190,000
Union of South Africa	150,000
Vatican City	15,000
Venezuela	170,000
Yugoslavia	100,000
	<hr/> 6,984,000

Countries Listed in the Agreement Which Have Been Granted an Extension of Time for the Deposit of Their Instruments

	Metric tons
Brazil	200,000
Lebanon	75,000
Netherlands	700,000
Panama	30,000
	<hr/> 1,005,000

Additional Acceding Country

Iceland	2,000
Total	<hr/> 7,991,000

and put into force in 1949 and 1953, as to both its general form and the character of the rights and obligations of members. It is a so-called multi-lateral contract, with importing countries required to take their guaranteed quantities from the exporting countries when called upon to do so at the specified minimum price, and exporting countries required to make wheat available up to the amount of their guaranteed quantity upon demand at the specified maximum price. Rights and obligations do not come into play when wheat is sold

within the range of the specified minimum and maximum prices, although provision is made for transactions to be recorded progressively with the Council secretariat against the contingent obligations.

This type of agreement was evolved in the wheat discussions sponsored by the old International Wheat Council in the late forties. It was negotiated at a time when importing countries were just emerging from the supply stringencies following World War II and when exporting countries were concerned about changes in the supply situation which would follow upon recovery of production in the importing countries. Thus protection for the importing countries against high prices in times of relative shortage could be bargained in return for protection of the exporting countries against undue reduction in prices when supplies became more plentiful. Furthermore, long experience in international efforts to deal with the wheat problem had demonstrated the difficulties of successful negotiation of the traditional quota type of commodity agreement, which sought to divide the whole world market among the exporters and to bind directly or indirectly both exporting and importing countries in various ways in regard to the conduct of national policies.

The new type of agreement recommended itself as workable short of universal participation by all countries important in wheat trade or of regulation under its terms of all wheat exported or imported by its member countries. The negotiations which led up to the renewal of this type of agreement in 1956 have again demonstrated conclusively that participating governments, virtually all of which conduct some type of government price support or marketing operation in wheat, are not prepared to include, in a commodity agreement on wheat, commitments regarding the conduct of national policies or to delegate to an international body any authority to direct such policies.

Trade Under 1949 and 1953 Agreements

The Wheat Agreement has since its genesis in 1949 functioned through wheat-supply conditions ranging from recent emergence from a world deficit following World War II to a world surplus at the present time. Thus under the first agreement in the 4-year period 1949-53 wheat was sold under the agreement at the specified maximum price (\$1.80 for No. 1 Manitoba Northern in posi-

tion at Fort William/Port Arthur, Canada) and for a considerable part of the period with imposition also of a carrying charge of 6 cents. Wheat was sold materially higher outside the agreement during this period.

In the first agreement year (1949-50) about 81.6 percent of the quotas of exporting countries was sold under the agreement; virtually the entire quantity was covered by the agreement in the 3 years which followed. The coverage of the 1949 agreement grew from 12,418,000 metric tons (456.2 million bushels) originally negotiated to 15,810,000 metric tons (580.9 million bushels) in the final year of the agreement (1952-53). This growth resulted from accessions of additional importing countries and from increases in quantities authorized under terms of the agreement to the extent exporting countries were prepared to match increases in guaranteed purchases by correspondingly increasing their guaranteed sales. The world emergency brought on by the Korean conflict had its effect on demand and prices during much of this period. The "guaranteed sales" in the 1949 agreement and the actual sales of the exporter members for each of the 4 years are listed on the following page.

The prices negotiated in the renewal of the agreement in 1953 reflected the fact that the 1949 price range (maximum \$1.80 and minimum receding from \$1.50 by 10 cents a year to \$1.20 the last year) had resulted in sales under the agreement at materially lower prices than the world market outside of the agreement. The prices were revised to a maximum of \$2.05 and a uniform minimum of \$1.55 over the 3-year life of the agreement. However, the largest importer, the United Kingdom, which had a guaranteed quantity of 177 million bushels in the 1949 agreement, refused to accept the 1953 agreement on the grounds that the maximum price was set too high. This agreement came to cover a quantity after adjustments of 10,749,000 metric tons (394.9 million bushels).

In the fall of 1953, shortly after the new agreement came into force, increased supplies of wheat and a falling off of exports brought the price below the maximum provided in the agreement. It remained during the rest of the 3-year life of the agreement, as far as Canada and the United States are concerned, in the range between the maximum and minimum and on a par with selling prices outside the agreement. At the lowest the price for the base quality (No. 1 Manitoba Northern in

EXPORTER QUOTAS AND SALES IN 1949 AGREEMENT ¹

(Metric tons, in wheat equivalent)

Exporting country	1949-50		1950-51	
	Quota	Sales	Quota	Sales
Australia	2, 199, 000	2, 199, 173	2, 414, 019	2, 375, 520. 33
Canada	5, 582, 000	5, 047, 048	6, 030, 757	5, 195, 004. 64
France	91, 000	90, 000	111, 283	105, 737. 99
United States	6, 419, 000	4, 424, 170	6, 755, 904	6, 794, 502. 44
Total	14, 291, 000	11, 760, 391	15, 309, 963	14, 450, 765. 40

Exporting country	1951-52		1952-53	
	Quota	Sales	Quota	Sales
Australia	1, 959, 519	1, 939, 166. 38	2, 414, 019	2, 358, 854. 14
Canada	6, 575, 653	6, 574, 897. 36	6, 395, 653	6, 288, 920. 62
France	111, 283	111, 200. 00	111, 283	92, 000. 00
United States	6, 544, 008	6, 947, 571. 78	6, 889, 008	6, 834, 882. 08
Total	15, 590, 463	15, 572, 835. 52	15, 809, 963	15, 574, 606. 84

¹ Annual Report of International Wheat Council for 1952-53.

position at Fort William/Port Arthur, Canada) stood about two-thirds of the way down from the maximum to the minimum (\$1.72) but later firmed at a somewhat higher level (\$1.75). However, discounts in the determination of price equivalents for other types, grades, and qualities, resulting from competition and the character of demand, in many cases brought the price for these materially lower in relation to the base price than formerly. During the latter part of the 3-year period Australia sold wheat nearer the minimum than did Canada and the United States.

With prices in the range where quota obligations did not directly enter into play and with wheat being sold by agreement exporting countries at the same price level outside the agreement and under the agreement, the full guaranteed quantities were not recorded during the years of the 1953 agreement. Sales so recorded averaged about 66 percent of the total covered by the agreement in each of the 3 years. The quotas and sales recorded against them for each of the 3 years of the agreement are shown at the right.

Figures of the Wheat Council on sales and purchases recorded under the 1953 agreement taken together with general wheat export statistics make it possible to show the relation to the total trade in wheat of the trade which was directly covered by the wheat agreement operation. The figures show that during the 3 years of the 1953 agreement (1953-54-1955-56) sales made by the four member exporting countries—Australia, Canada, France, and the United States—to member importing countries and recorded under the agreement constituted about 58 percent of the total trade in wheat between these two groups. The wheat thus sold under the agreement consti-

tuted about 45 percent of the total imported from all sources by the member importing countries. It accounted for 40 percent of the total exported by member exporting countries to all destinations. However, analyzing the exports of each member individually, one finds that the proportion of agreement sales to global exports of each varied greatly. For Australia and the United States, it made up about 45 percent; for Canada, 33 percent; and for France, which had only a token quantity in the agreement and had become a relatively heavy exporter, half of one percent. Per-

EXPORTER QUOTAS AND SALES IN 1953 WHEAT AGREEMENT ¹

(In metric tons, to nearest ton)

Exporting country	1953-54	
	Quota	Sales
Australia	1, 207, 170	755, 987
Canada	4, 105, 247	2, 473, 731
France	9, 215	10, 000
United States	5, 270, 368	2, 888, 007
Total	10, 592, 000	6, 128, 725

Exporting country	1954-55	
	Quota	Sales
Australia	1, 219, 137	1, 129, 792
Canada	4, 145, 943	2, 972, 012
France	9, 307	10, 220
United States	5, 322, 613	3, 796, 866
Total	10, 697, 000	7, 908, 890

Exporting country	1955-56	
	Quota	Sales
Australia	1, 225, 064	1, 222, 441
Canada	4, 166, 097	2, 063, 493
France	9, 352	9, 878
United States	5, 348, 487	3, 649, 000
Total	10, 749, 000	6, 944, 812

¹ Figures from International Wheat Council Annual Reports.

inent totals for the period from 1953-54 through 1955-56 follow:

Average annual total of trans- 6,994,000 metric tons.
actions recorded under agree-
ment.

Average annual total exports of 12,090,000 metric
member exporting countries tons.*
to member importing coun-
tries.

Average annual total imports of 15,374,000 metric
member importing countries tons.*
from all sources.

Average annual total of exports of 17,622,000 metric
member exporting countries tons.*
to all destinations.

*Approximate figures, since 1955-56 component is pre-
liminary.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

General Assembly Adopts Two Resolutions on Middle East Question

Following are the texts of two statements on the Middle East question made in the plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly on February 2 by U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., together with two resolutions adopted by the Assembly on the same date.

FIRST STATEMENT ON FEBRUARY 2

U.S. delegation press release 2607

The United States has participated in extensive consultations in the last few days in order to reach a just and constructive solution of the difficult problems which confront us. These consultations have revealed clearly that a very large number of members of this Assembly are convinced of two things:

First, Israel must withdraw behind the armistice line without further delay in accordance with the resolutions of the General Assembly.

Second, there must be positive action which assures progress toward the creation of peaceful conditions in the region.

The two resolutions now before the Assembly reflect these sentiments. We believe their adoption will go far to assure achievement of these two objectives.

The first resolution represents the position consistently taken by the United States and almost unanimously by the Assembly that the withdrawal

of all remaining Israeli forces must be completed without further delay. We appreciate the necessity of avoiding the return to the conditions that prevailed prior to the recent hostilities. But we are convinced that the measures to restore peaceful conditions in the area, as required by the Armistice Agreement and the relevant decisions of the Security Council and the General Assembly, should be taken upon the withdrawal of all Israeli forces behind the armistice line. We do not believe that any member is entitled to exact a price for his compliance with the elementary principle of this Organization, that all members shall refrain from use of force against the territorial integrity of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. The United States again urges Israel to heed the call of the General Assembly and promptly complete the withdrawal of its forces.

We recognize, however, that such withdrawal will not assure tranquillity in troubled areas where there are conflicting claims. So we join in proposing the second resolution. This deals with the measures set forth in the Secretary-General's report (A/3512).¹ It also accords with the position consistently taken by the United States and expressed by a majority of the General Assembly. Upon the withdrawal of Israeli forces, the United

¹ BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1957, p. 275.

Nations Emergency Force should continue to move into the areas being evacuated by Israeli forces, in order to assure the implementation of the November 2 resolution of the General Assembly. This was the case when previous withdrawals were effected. It worked well then; it should work well now. What we suggest today, therefore, is not new. It is a continuation of a procedure which has been highly satisfactory.

I stated on January 28 that the United States believes that "strict observance by both Egypt and Israel of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement and the fullest respect for the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly are the keys to the restoration of peace and stability." To be effective, the United Nations Emergency Force must serve as a restraint against any attempt to exercise belligerent rights or to engage in hostile actions contrary to the Armistice Agreement, the decisions of the Security Council, and the resolutions of the General Assembly.

The United Nations Emergency Force can best fulfill its mission and exercise such restraining influence if, as proposed in the Secretary-General's report, it is deployed on both sides of the armistice line, particularly in the sensitive Gaza and El Auja sectors. This will enable it to cooperate most effectively in the supervisory duties of the Truce Supervision Organization in those areas where the Organization is authorized to function under the Armistice Agreement and the relevant resolution of the Security Council.

Again, with regard to Gaza, the United States supports the Secretary-General's recommendation. The Secretary-General should, through a mission of his selection, supervise the withdrawal of the present civil administration in the Gaza strip and take steps to assure that incursions or raids across the armistice line in the Gaza area will not take place. The second resolution would provide for carrying out these measures.

As I also stated on January 28, the United States believes that "it is essential that units of the United Nations Emergency Force be stationed at the Straits of Tiran in order to achieve there the separation of Egyptian and Israeli land and sea forces. This separation is essential until it is clear that the nonexercise of any claimed belligerent rights has established in practice the peaceful conditions which must govern navigation in waters having such an international interest. All of this

would, of course, be without prejudice to any ultimate determination which may be made of any legal questions concerning the Gulf of Aqaba." The second resolution reflects this position taken by the United States in my statement of January 28.

The adoption of the second resolution now before the Assembly would place the authority of the General Assembly behind the speedy implementation of the measures proposed in the report of the Secretary-General. The United States strongly supports this resolution. It deserves the largest possible support from the General Assembly.

Mr. President, the United States requests that the two resolutions be considered together, that the second resolution be put to the vote immediately after the first, and understands that this will be done. The adoption of either one without the other would jeopardize the achievement of the objectives set forth in the resolution of November 2 and would not promote peace and stability in the region.

Mr. President, before I take my seat, let me say this very frankly to the members of the Assembly. There is no doubt that these are not perfect documents. For one thing, they are the work of human beings—which, of course, is guaranty enough against perfection. For another thing, they are the product of compromise. But they do contain the words which will make possible the events of which I have just spoken. They do, therefore, contain the words which can lead away from hostilities and toward an era of peace in this part of the world, *if* the parties desire to abide by these words.

Of course this is a crucial "if" in anything that we contemplate here in the General Assembly on any subject. We are not engaged here in running a world government or a superstate which passes resolutions having the force of law. We are a forum engaged in passing resolutions which can have great influence. What we do is hortatory and recommendatory. And the final result is up to the parties.

We hope they will fall in with this plan which can mean so much to them and to the world. We see encouraging signs. Passage of these resolutions represents our effort to persuade them to do so. It is an effort which all of us who are members of the General Assembly are—so it seems to the United States—bound to make.

SECOND STATEMENT ON FEBRUARY 2

U.S. delegation press release 2608

The United States has a few added observations to make regarding its position on the matter before us arising out of questions which have been raised in the debate as well as questions which have been addressed to me during the recess. Some of these points have been discussed and I think very ably discussed by the representative of India and in a manner with which I find myself in substantial agreement. But I think it may be useful if I touch upon certain ones again.

First, the United States has time and again urged the withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the armistice demarcation line. We believe this withdrawal should take place forthwith, and by forthwith we mean that the withdrawal should take place in only the few days necessary physically to move the forces behind the demarcation line.

As a matter of fact, it seems to me that this withdrawal should take less time than was taken by the British and French withdrawals since those withdrawals were delayed by the time necessary to set up and create the United Nations Emergency Force. Now, on the other hand, the United Nations Emergency Force is a going concern; so there need be no delay on that account.

While I am on this subject of withdrawals, which of course is the sole object of the first resolution and which is the governing, overriding consideration of the second resolution, let me also say this in all seriousness and solemnity: that I cannot predict the consequences which can ensue if Israel fails to comply with the will of the General Assembly as expressed in the pending resolutions.

Let me make clear another point which appears to have caused some concern. The measures contained in the Secretary-General's report, which are referred to in the second resolution before us, would not go into effect until Israel's withdrawals have been completed. We have previously taken note and endorsed the Secretary-General's view that "withdrawal is a preliminary and essential phase in a development through which a stable basis may be laid for peaceful conditions in the area." We believe withdrawal is the first essential step. None of the constructive measures included in the second resolution are intended to go into effect until Israel has completed its withdrawal. Nor, let me add once again, will any of

them be undertaken without the agreement of the affected party. It is for this reason that paragraph 4 asks the Secretary-General to consult with the affected party.

I would like to express the hope before I take my seat that delegates will take a broad and understanding view of this. There are no hidden meanings in it. It is not a perfect document, but it represents the best that a lot of very serious members here have been able to produce to lead us out of a very difficult and dangerous situation.

RESOLUTION I¹

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956, 998 (ES-I) and 999 (ES-I) of 4 November 1956, 1002 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956, A/RES/410 of 24 November 1956 and A/RES/453 of 19 January 1957,

1. *Deplores* the non-compliance of Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line despite the repeated requests of the General Assembly;
2. *Calls upon* Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line without further delay.

RESOLUTION II²

The General Assembly,

Having received the report of the Secretary-General of 24 January 1957,³

Recognizing that withdrawal by Israel must be followed by action which would assure progress towards the creation of peaceful conditions,

1. *Notes with appreciation* the Secretary-General's report and the measures therein to be carried out upon Israel's complete withdrawal;
2. *Calls upon* the Governments of Egypt and Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel of 24 February 1949;⁴
3. *Considers* that, after full withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm el-Sheikh and Gaza areas, the scrupulous main-

¹ U.N. doc. A/Res/460; adopted by the General Assembly on Feb. 2 by a vote of 74 to 2 (France, Israel), with 2 abstentions (Luxembourg, Netherlands).

² U.N. doc. A/Res/461; adopted by the General Assembly on Feb. 2 by a vote of 56 to 0, with 22 abstentions (Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Netherlands, Poland, Rumania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Ukrainian S.S.R., U.S.S.R., Yemen).

³ U.N. doc. A/3512.

⁴ *Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 3.*

tenance of the Armistice Agreement requires the placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israeli armistice demarcation line and the implementation of other measures as proposed in the Secretary-General's report, with due regard to the considerations set out therein with a view to assist in achieving situations con-

ducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the area;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties concerned, to take steps to carry out these measures and to report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly.

Industrialization of Underdeveloped Countries

Statement by Paul G. Hoffman
*U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*¹

I believe we are all agreed that, if standards of living throughout the world are to be substantially improved, it is essential that there be a continual expansion of manufacturing facilities—particularly in the underdeveloped countries.

Clearly, the industrially advanced countries could not, even with their great industrial potential and under conditions of continued full employment, supply all the manufactures which the world needs. That is why there must be an expansion of industrialization in the less developed areas. Consequently the underdeveloped countries are eager, and rightly so, to obtain the means by which they themselves can produce sorely needed materials and manufactured goods in local factories with local labor. To help them along this road is one of the great opportunities of the United Nations—an opportunity that should be welcomed by all the members of this organization.

It has sometimes been suggested that there exists a basic conflict of interest between countries which are already largely industrialized and the aspirations for greater industrialization of the less developed countries. We do not accept this argument. On the contrary, I am confident that I reflect the view of the majority of American businessmen when I say that we are convinced that greater industrialization of the underdeveloped countries, with its accompanying diversification of their economies and increase of their national income, is in the interest of all countries—the developed countries as well as those in the early stages of economic development. The fact that

the largest proportion of the assistance we made available under the Marshall plan was to reconstruct and increase the productivity of industry in Western Europe reflects the attitude of the United States toward industrialization of other countries. I shall be speaking later of ways in which we are currently assisting underdeveloped countries in this same field.

As has been pointed out by various speakers during our previous discussion of problems of economic development, the best customers of industrialized countries are other industrialized countries. This proposition is clearly demonstrated by the fact that a major portion of the world's exports of manufactured goods moves, not to the less developed, but between industrialized countries.

We in the United States also appreciate the magnitude of the job that confronts a country taking the first steps toward industrialization of its economy. During our own relatively brief history as a developing country, we have had to deal with many of the same problems which now confront the less developed countries. At the same time, the American people are among the first to recognize the benefits to be obtained from diversification and industrialization. For these reasons they welcome the opportunity of contributing to the process of industrialization in underdeveloped countries.

The United States has been able to assist in this process both through private enterprise and through our foreign aid programs. The supply of industrial know-how, the construction of manufacturing enterprises, the provision of capital

¹ Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) on Jan. 23 (U.S. delegation press release 2596).

resources—these are some of the ways in which we have been able to help. All of you are, of course, familiar with the support we are also giving to similar efforts through such multilateral programs as United Nations technical assistance, the International Bank, the International Finance Corporation, and other specialized agencies working in the field of industrial development.

The members of this Committee may be interested in specific illustrations of ways in which American business enterprises and our Government have participated in bringing the seeds of industrialization to underdeveloped countries around the world.

Contribution of U.S. Business

All students of the problems of industrialization have long recognized the key importance of an expanded pool of labor and technical skills. Our automobile industry is engaged in manufacturing or assembly operations in many foreign countries, both developed and underdeveloped. An important part of its relationships with its overseas establishments consists of sending technicians and engineers abroad to transmit their knowledge and experience to the overseas factories and of bringing people from overseas to the United States for similar training. Many of these overseas factories carry on training programs, not only for workers employed directly by the companies but also for others engaged in related activities, such as automobile service stations—thus adding to the local reservoir of mechanics and skilled workers.

For example, hundreds of young men have passed through the technical training courses given at one of these company plants located in São Paulo, Brazil, spreading their knowledge to the four corners of the country. The plant is constantly visited by students from vocational schools, and a large number of engineers have been trained there in order to become acquainted with the most modern methods of industrial production. Others have been sent abroad with all expenses paid by the company. In this and many other ways the company's long-accumulated experience of manufacturing cars, trucks, parts, and accessories is being passed on to the Brazilian people, opening new technical horizons for Brazil's younger generation and new opportunities for careers that will contribute directly to Brazil's economic strength.

Atul Products, Limited, located in India, is an example of how American private industry stands ready to work with a locally controlled and managed enterprise. The company was established in 1952 to manufacture dyestuffs and pharmaceuticals. Ninety percent of its capital was locally subscribed; 10 percent was provided by the American Cyanamid Company. The American firm has no share in the actual management of the plant, but it has provided much of the necessary technical assistance. The dyes produced by this enterprise now fill a substantial part of the demands of the textile and other industries in India. Its production of sulfa drugs and antibiotics makes possible more effective implementation of the country's health program.

This interest in foreign operations is by no means limited to our large business enterprises. Hundreds of relatively small concerns are also eager to use their know-how and experience in other countries. One example of how such relatively small enterprises are assisting the creation of industry in underdeveloped countries is provided by the Anchor Precision Corporation, which, since 1948, has set up factories in 15 countries for the manufacture of zippers. In addition to building the factories, the company supplies the know-how and machinery and trains the nationals of each country in its operation. Thus far the company has built plants in Burma, India, and Korea, as well as in South America and Europe. The corporation undertakes surveys to determine the size of the local market; its engineering staff advises on the size of the plant required and provides the necessary blueprints; the company makes available the required machinery, which is installed with the assistance of company engineers, who also select and train the necessary supervisory staff from among local nationals.

Government Programs

Governmental efforts are increasingly supplementing the achievements of private enterprise. Over the past 2 or 3 years, there has been a steady growth in the industrial component of our bilateral technical assistance program, now administered by the International Cooperation Administration. Today about 55 percent of our aid programs in underdeveloped countries relates to industrial development. We expect that this growth will continue, and we are ready to con-

sider requests for this kind of assistance to the extent that funds and the necessary technical personnel are available.

A typical example of the activities carried on under this program is the visit to the United States early last year of a group of management, technical, and labor representatives of the Mexican shoe industry to study the factors that contribute to the high productivity of the American shoe industry. The objective of this visit was to assist Mexico in increasing the efficiency of its own shoe industry and thus to lower the cost of its products to the Mexican consumer.

At about the same time a team of 11 representatives of government, industry, and labor arrived from Uruguay for an intensive 6-week study, with the assistance of the International Cooperation Administration, of the basic factors underlying the high productivity of labor in the United States. During its study tour the group gave special attention to such matters as industrial engineering, production planning, market research, and personnel administration in their overall application to industrial development.

Our Export-Import Bank for years has been making credits available not only to help finance basic development in fields such as transportation, power, communications, and public health but also for a wide variety of manufacturing projects. In recent months, the bank has financed exports of steel-mill equipment for Brazil; cotton textile machinery for Colombia; sugar-mill machinery for Ecuador; machinery and equipment for industrial development in the Philippines; rayon-spinning machines for India; and thermopower equipment for Iran.

U.N. Aid to Industrialization

Our immediate problem in this Committee is to consider what contribution the United Nations can most usefully make to the efforts of the underdeveloped countries through research and study in this field. Because of the widespread interest in rapid industrialization and the expectations of economic progress based on such development, it is extremely important that industrial planning be soundly conceived. At the same time, every means must be explored for shortening the time necessary to achieve an adequate level of efficient industrialization in underdeveloped areas and to initiate development programs which will in turn

stimulate the creation of further industrial capacity.

The United States delegation in the [22d session of the] Economic and Social Council participated in the detailed consideration of the Secretary-General's proposed program of work in this field and supported its endorsement by the Council. At that time the United States delegation also indicated a number of points which we feel the Secretary-General will wish to keep in mind when carrying out his proposed work program.

I shall not repeat these at this time. I do wish, however, to emphasize a point which has also been made by other delegations—that studies by the Secretariat will be helpful to underdeveloped countries in direct proportion to the extent to which they address themselves to concrete problems facing these countries and are presented in such ways as to be utilized by persons in the underdeveloped countries concerned with practical problems of economic development. The United States representative in Ecosoc also pointed out that national agencies such as our own International Cooperation Administration have already made extensive studies in the field of industrialization. As he indicated at that time, the United States is ready to make available to the Secretary-General the results of our work and experience.

During the period of my association with the Economic Cooperation Administration, where we were also working on projects of industrialization in underdeveloped areas encompassed by the Marshall plan, I was able to observe some of the difficulties which had to be overcome in getting such programs under way. I came to appreciate what steps had to be taken first if effective progress in spreading industry in such areas was to be achieved without wasting resources.

I was particularly impressed with the need for first clearly determining the basic requirements of the population in the way of manufactured goods—the things they needed and desired to obtain, the goods they would buy if they became available. Only with this information could the necessary choices be rationally made regarding the priorities to be assigned a series of desirable projects in the field of industrial development. Our experience in this field also strongly indicated the desirability of building, where possible, on what already existed in the area by way of capac-

ity and skills in the particular industries selected for expansion. This might take the form of expanding existing small enterprises, or introducing new tools or techniques into existing handicraft or cottage industries, or introducing alterations of product design to make it more acceptable to potential markets and thus provide a basis for the expansion of industrial activity. Here is an area where technical assistance and advisory services by the United Nations could be extremely helpful.

I think that the wisdom of this line of approach has been demonstrated in a number of instances where countries in the early stages of industrialization have invested in plants constructed on a relatively excessive scale and having no particular relationship to the bulk of already existing industry. While the objectives of such investment may have been desirable—such as low cost, quantity production, or most modern design—in many cases they were not attained because of the great difficulty in constructing and successfully managing large establishments.

The resulting delays in obtaining efficient levels of production have meant excessive costs. Against these risks and the lack of flexibility of large installations, the advantages of a large number of smaller factories have often been strikingly demonstrated. The trend to large installations has fallen off and even been reversed in many industries in the developed countries. Competing side by side with large factories are medium and small firms which utilize the same modern design and techniques and operate at comparable low production costs. Investments in such smaller plants, which, as I have said, might simply be an extension of already existing facilities, by countries starting out on the road of industrial development may often mean that production and management objectives will be much more rapidly attained.

Another point which emerges from a close analysis of a number of underdeveloped countries which in recent years have attained a notable rate of industrial growth is the importance of private investment in such development. It is evident that, in any democratic society, governmental resources for new industrial investment are limited. If desired rates of development are to be obtained, substantial amounts of private investment funds must be attracted. This is particularly true in

view of the extensive requirements for governmental financing in the public and social services sectors of the economy.

In recent years many underdeveloped countries have become familiar with the ways in which engineering and construction firms operate in carrying out economic development projects. A similar familiarity with world capital markets and investment firms is required. Many observers are convinced that considerably greater amounts of investment funds could be obtained from foreign capital markets for underdeveloped areas if the underdeveloped countries were better acquainted with the institutional operation of this important source of capital.

Need for Exploring Resources

The pattern of industrialized and underdeveloped countries which exists today is obviously not a permanent pattern. The world is still young in the exploration of the resources with which nature has endowed it and in the ways in which these resources can be utilized. Many a country which thinks it is poor in resources may find, by taking careful stock of what it has, that it has possibilities for economic development now unknown. Even more, as technology continues to develop, apparently useless resources may become of great value. The fact of the matter is that we never know how rich a country is in resources until it starts to industrialize and to develop a large class of scientifically trained citizens who know how to locate resources and to recognize them when they see them.

This is not to imply, of course, that industrialization in the narrow sense of manufacturing is the only road to economic development. Economic development means progress in many fields—in agriculture, mining, transportation, communications, and power and in the skills and capacities of the people. All of these are mutually reinforcing elements in the process. And they are all competing claimants for the resources available, particularly capital. The wise apportionment of scarce resources among these elements must necessarily vary in time and circumstances. In the field of manufacturing itself, countries can obtain the largest return from investment if they emphasize enterprises most suited to their resources and skills.

During our discussion of general problems of

economic development, we heard from at least two of the countries present of the costly consequences of forced-draft industrialization which neglected other sectors of the economy. A recent statement by a leading Hungarian official in the newspaper *Nepakarat* also gives some serious food for thought in this respect. He stated on January 4 that—

Wrong economic leadership, unrealistic plans, and industrial development which ignored our economic peculiarities and possibilities, as well as the neglect of agricultural production and the suppression of incen-

tives stimulating production, caused a grave crisis in the Hungarian economy even before October 23rd.

Mr. Chairman, in some areas the industrialization of underdeveloped countries is only beginning. In others, it has already made encouraging strides. I have indicated some of the ways in which the people of the United States are contributing to this tremendous world revolution of our times. In the American tradition, we shall continue to work with the peoples of the underdeveloped countries both through the United Nations and directly to the best of our abilities in the years ahead.

U.N. Special Political Committee Recommends Admission of Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam

*Statements by Edward S. Greenbaum
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly¹*

STATEMENT OF JANUARY 23

U.S. delegation press release 2597

It is with genuine pleasure that I speak on behalf of my Government in support of the resolutions for the early admission of the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam.²

Last year the General Assembly and the Security Council broke the longstanding deadlock on new members. The Security Council continued throughout the year to consider and approve other applicants for membership in the United Nations on their merits. Twenty new states were admitted. But the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam were not. In spite of having been found fully qualified for membership in the United Nations on separate occasions and individually by the General Assembly, both these countries were again prevented from securing United Nations membership by the abuse of the veto on the part of the U.S.S.R.

In the new and more hopeful situation created by the admission of new members to the United Nations, the exclusion of these two fully qualified applicants from our midst has become an even

more glaring injustice. In the practical interests of making it possible for other applicants to be received, the General Assembly refrained last year from pressing for consideration of these applications. These restraints are no longer pertinent. The time has again come for the General Assembly to reaffirm its findings and request the Security Council to act. This is what the draft resolutions seek to do, and we hope that they will be given wide support.

Korea

In considering Korean membership, I am sure we all have in mind the special and unique place that the Republic of Korea has in relation to the United Nations. In 1947 the United Nations recommended that Korea be unified through democratic elections to be held throughout the peninsula under the observation of a United Nations commission. When the U.S.S.R. refused to permit the 1947 resolution of the United Nations General Assembly to be carried out in its zone of occupation and refused to permit the United Nations Commission to enter that zone, the resolution was nonetheless carried out in the southern zone of Korea where the great majority of the Korean peo-

¹ Made in the Special Political Committee.

² U.N. docs. A/SPC/L.7 and Add. 1 and A/SPC/L.8 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1.

ple reside. These democratic elections resulted in the establishment of the Republic of Korea.

The United Nations Commission reported on these activities to the third session of the General Assembly. In its resolution 195 (III) of 12 December 1948 the Assembly declared that "there has been established a lawful government (the Government of the Republic of Korea) having effective control and jurisdiction over that part of Korea where the Temporary Commission was able to observe and consult and in which the great majority of the people of all Korea reside." The resolution continued with the statement "that this Government is based on elections which were a valid expression of the free will of the electorate of that part of Korea and which were observed by the Temporary Commission; and that this is the only such Government in Korea."

Since then the United Nations has reflected its recognition of the Republic of Korea as the only lawful government in Korea by seating its delegation for discussion of the Korean problem while refusing to seat representatives of the puppet regime in North Korea. The Republic of Korea has participated actively in the work of many of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. This Assembly has on several occasions previously recommended the Republic of Korea for membership in the United Nations. It has been excluded from membership only by the negative vote of the U.S.S.R.

Although thus kept from membership in the United Nations by an arbitrary Soviet vote, the Republic of Korea has nonetheless played an active role in the community of nations, in connection with the United Nations and otherwise. More than 30 states have extended formal recognition to the Republic of Korea. The Communist regime in North Korea, on the other hand, has been recognized only by the Communist bloc.

The Republic of Korea is unique in its relationship to the United Nations. This country has become the symbol of the first great effort of the free world to take collective action against aggression. Members of the United Nations contributed forces and material to repel the North Korean and Chinese Communist aggressions. The Republic of Korea shared fully in this struggle. Korean soldiers fought side by side with men from the countries under the United Nations Command.

The aspirations of the Government of the Re-

public of Korea and the Korean people to membership in the United Nations have been strong for many years. The Republic of Korea has existed as a state for more than 8 years. It has continued to welcome the activities of the United Nations Commissions, which include observation of the development of representative government within the Republic of Korea. The Government of the Republic of Korea has repeatedly indicated its interest in and strong desire for United Nations membership. In recent months the Korean people themselves have demonstrated this in a truly remarkable way. Almost 10 million of them have signed petitions which have been delivered to the United Nations Secretary-General.

The Government of the United States considers the Republic of Korea fully qualified for membership in the United Nations and urges that this General Assembly so recommend in the proposed resolution.

Viet-Nam

The Government of the United States also warmly supports the application of Viet-Nam. Successor to the ancient Empire of Annam, the Republic of Viet-Nam, although young in terms of regaining its juridical independence, is old in terms of culture and tradition.

After many years of war its people are resuming peaceful pursuits and its countryside is generally orderly and calm. It has absorbed more than three-fourths of a million refugees who preferred to leave their ancestral lands and homes rather than suffer life under Communist tyranny. In the past 2 years this country has made an almost miraculous recovery from the disrupted and tormented condition that caused many to doubt its prospects for survival.

There is no doubt that Viet-Nam fulfills the conditions laid down in article 4 of the charter, as the Assembly has already determined. It has declared itself willing to accept the obligations arising out of the charter and has demonstrated ability to do so by its efforts in the political, economic, and administrative spheres. As exemplified in the successful holding of free elections in March 1956, Viet-Nam has proved the vitality of its democratic institutions.

Viet-Nam has clearly shown its acceptance of the obligations contained in the charter and its desire to make constructive contributions to the

United Nations and to the principles of the charter. It has done so by its membership in the various specialized organizations, the World Meteorological Organization, the International Telecommunication Union, the Universal Postal Union, the World Health Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the International Civil Aviation Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Bank, and the International Labor Organization, as well as in the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE).

The fact that the Republic of Viet-Nam has already been recognized by more than 47 countries as a sovereign and independent state is eloquent testimony to its qualifications.

The Government of the United States considers the Republic of Viet-Nam fully qualified for membership in the United Nations and urges that this General Assembly so recommend in the proposed resolution:

For these reasons my Government has joined with other governments in sponsoring the draft resolutions now before us. These resolutions seek to have the General Assembly reaffirm its determination that these two countries are fully qualified for admission to membership in the United Nations and request the Security Council to reconsider their applications in the light of this determination.

STATEMENT OF JANUARY 30

U.S. delegation press release 2604

On the important question of the admission of new members to the United Nations, the United States has consistently adhered to these principles: *first*, that all qualified states which apply should be admitted; *second*, that, in determining the qualifications of applicants for membership, strict regard must be paid to the provisions of the charter.

We believe that these principles are basic to the United Nations Charter. Membership in this body is a solemn matter; it involves rights, duties, and obligations vital to world peace and security. It must not be the subject of bargains or deals.

The draft resolution tabled by the Soviet

Union³ is in clear violation of these principles. The resolution lists four applicants for admission and requests the Security Council to recommend the "simultaneous admission" of all of them. The words "simultaneous admission" are not mine. They are in the resolution. The implication is that, if we do not accept this "all or nothing" demand, the Soviet Union is ready to use the veto again in the Security Council. It would thus again be abusing the voting privilege given to five nations in the expectation that it would be used only in exceptional circumstances.

The draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union not only flouts the spirit of the charter. It is also in clear violation of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice of May 28, 1948.⁴

What is the practical effect of the proposal of the Soviet Union? It arbitrarily lumps together two states which, by every test, meet the charter specifications with two other political entities which, it is generally conceded, do not meet the standards of the charter. It couples the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam, which on numerous occasions have been endorsed for admission by heavy majorities in the General Assembly and the Security Council, with North Korea and North Viet-Nam, which have never been found qualified either by the Assembly or by the Security Council.

In my earlier intervention, Mr. Chairman, I pointed out why, in the opinion of my Government, the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam are fully qualified for membership in the United Nations. Many other delegates have clearly set forth the reasons why their governments have arrived at a like conclusion. The Soviet proposal makes it necessary to examine the claims put forward on behalf of North Korea and North Viet-

³ U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.9. Under the Soviet proposal the General Assembly would request the Security Council, "having regard to the general opinion that the composition of the United Nations should be as universal as possible, to reconsider the applications of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam with a view to recommending the simultaneous admission of all these states to membership in the United Nations."

⁴ In its advisory opinion the Court said, in effect, that a member of the United Nations called upon to express itself on the admission of an applicant state was not juridically entitled to make its consent dependent on conditions not expressly provided by the membership article of the charter.

Nam. It is true that we know very little about these areas because the familiar Communist barriers to information seal them off from contact with the free world. But what we do know is certainly not reassuring. In fact, there is every reason to consider them not as states in the juridical sense of the term, but as some sort of Communist political entity standing in a subordinate relationship to Moscow or Peiping, or both.

How do they meet the requirements of article 4 of the charter?

Communist Regimes in North Korea and North Viet-Nam

Let us first consider North Korea. Since the nature and policies of the North Korean regime have frequently been discussed in this Assembly and in other bodies of the United Nations, I will merely touch upon the following important and well-established facts. First, the U.S.S.R., which occupied the northern zone of Korea in 1945, never permitted the unification of Korea through nationwide democratic elections under United Nations observation, as called for in the General Assembly resolution of November 1947. Second, the Soviet authorities excluded the United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea from the northern zone. Thirdly, the structure of this regime has differed hardly at all from the Soviet occupation regime. Many of the leaders of the regime, as has often been pointed out in discussions in the United Nations, are Soviet citizens. Fourthly, the North Korean regime was set up in defiance of the United Nations; it has been guilty of aggression which had to be repelled by United Nations military action. Fifthly, since the cessation of those hostilities, it has engaged in an ominous military buildup in violation of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement.

The regime in North Viet-Nam likewise had its origins in subversion and violence. Ever since it came into being, its activities, overt and covert, have constituted a serious threat to the security and happiness of its neighbors to the south and west. Clearly it is not a peace-loving state.

This Communist regime fails to fulfill the requirements of article 4 of the charter.

First, in 1953 and 1954 the Communist Viet Minh forces invaded Laos and in 1954 menaced its capital city, Luang Prabang.

Second, the North Vietnamese Communists have flagrantly interfered in the internal affairs of Laos. This provoked the Prime Minister of Laos on June 20, 1956, to complain about such acts of interference as the presence of Viet Minh cadres and the supply of arms and ammunition to those units.

Third, the Vietnamese Communists have imported voluminous quantities of arms across the Chinese frontier. This was vividly stated by the British Government in a diplomatic note sent to Moscow and released to the press in April of last year. It said, "The Viet Minh Army has been so greatly strengthened by the embodiment and the re-equipment of irregular forces that, instead of the seven divisions in existence in July 1954, there are now not less than twenty." This striking contrast of military expansion in the North and the withdrawal and reduction of military forces in the South speaks for itself.

Fourth, the Vietnamese Communists still show utter disregard for human rights. For example, only 2 months ago, according to the Hanoi radio itself, uprisings took place in North Viet-Nam. Villagers protested against the so-called "land reform" decrees imposed by the Communist regime and tried to seek refuge in South Viet-Nam. Several thousand troops with armored cars and heavy weapons moved into the area, crushing these gatherings of unarmed men and women. Yet the United Nations is asked to admit this northern puppet regime as a peace-loving state!

In neither North Viet-Nam nor North Korea has there been anything that could by any stretch of the imagination be called free elections. Yet we do have a striking demonstration of how the people of North Viet-Nam and North Korea feel about their Communist masters. That is shown by the action of the refugees, now numbering into the millions, who have fled from their homes to areas of the free world. This mass flight of desperate human beings, braving enormous dangers, is a clear repudiation of their regimes.

It is significant, Mr. Chairman, that even those delegates who spoke in favor of the Soviet proposal have not submitted any facts which warrant this committee in holding that either North Viet-Nam or North Korea are peace-loving states or accept the obligations contained in the charter. Nor have they submitted any facts which would

warrant the United Nations in judging that these states are either able or willing to carry out the obligations of the charter. We submit that they failed to do so because there are no such facts. Their complete silence on this point gives eloquent evidence of their inability to muster any facts in support of the eligibility of these two puppet states. Neither North Viet-Nam nor North Korea has the necessary qualifications for membership in the United Nations.

The delegate from the Soviet Union tries to make it appear that we contend that the test is whether or not the economic or social character of the applicant is to our liking. We, of course, make no such contention. What we do contend is that the applicant must have the qualifications specified in article 4 of the charter.

Question of Unification

In the course of his speech the Soviet delegate declared that the problem to be solved is the unification of Korea and Viet-Nam. He then said that the only solution to this problem lies in the acceptance of the proposal contained in his draft resolution. I submit that such action would have precisely the opposite effect from what the Soviet delegate would have us believe. The United Nations would by its action not only sacrifice the fundamental principles of the charter, it would also perpetuate and give its blessing to the tragic division of these two nations. We must not forget that this division was caused by, and has been maintained by, Communist defiance and contempt for the United Nations. Only in the encouragement of peace-loving and democratic forms of government lies the way toward the eventual solution of the problem of unification.

Were the Soviet argument to prevail, it would enable the U.S.S.R. to prevent the United Nations from admitting to membership any state that it had succeeded in splintering. The argument is that the mere existence of the puppet regime which it has created—even though totally lacking in qualifications for membership—prevents the admission of the peace-loving, qualified state. Who can honestly claim that the denial of membership to these qualified states that we are now considering will hasten unification? The fact is, we believe, that denial of such membership will perpetuate existing conditions and that granting admission to them in accordance with the principles

of the United Nations will hasten unification.

Mr. Chairman, in the light of all these facts, it is no wonder that virtually no state outside the Communist orbit has seen fit to extend recognition to the regimes of North Korea and North Viet-Nam. By the same token, it appears to us unthinkable that these two countries should be proposed for membership in the United Nations. For this reason my delegation has opposed, and will continue to oppose, their applications. My delegation will vote against their admission.

The arguments which I have advanced above are also pertinent to the draft resolution tabled yesterday by India and Syria.⁵ This resolution, which recalls the Tenth General Assembly's resolution 918 of December 8, 1955,⁶ would have this Committee and the General Assembly take no stand on the membership question this year but would leave the matter entirely in the hands of the Security Council. This is more than a procedural resolution. In effect, this proposal reduces all the applicants, regardless of their past history and present qualifications, to the same footing. This is substantive, *not* procedural.

I submit that such an action would do grave injustice to the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam. These two countries—and only these two of all the applicants mentioned here—have repeatedly been found qualified for membership in the United Nations by the General Assembly and the Security Council. In 1955, because of then existing considerations involving the admission of other qualified applicants, the Tenth General Assembly decided to refrain from pressing the applications of the Republics of Viet-Nam and Korea at that time. That was resolution 918 of the Tenth General Assembly adopted on December 8, 1955. I am not ignoring it. On the contrary, I am specifically referring to it. As the representative of the U.S.S.R. said, the General Assembly then felt that it was "untimely" to act on these two applications at that time. But the circumstances which caused this restraint do not exist today. They certainly did not wipe out the past endorsements of the Assembly nor raise to respectability countries which have never been found qualified for membership. In all fairness to the two small and courageous Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam we should reaffirm our previous findings in their cases

⁵ U.N. doc. A/SPC/L.12.

⁶ BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1069.

and should thereby let them and the world know that we have not abandoned them.

Mr. Chairman, representatives of the Soviet Union and of India and Syria have indicated that they will ask that their respective resolutions be given priority over the resolutions previously submitted by the 13 powers on the subject of membership for the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam. For the reasons which I have set forth earlier, we firmly oppose the admission of the North Korean and North Viet-Nam regimes. Likewise, we oppose giving priority to the Soviet draft resolution. For the reasons which we and other co-sponsors of the 13-power draft resolution have stated, we believe that the General Assembly should be given the opportunity of reaffirming its belief that the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam should be admitted to membership. For that reason we oppose giving priority to the draft resolution proposed by India. Instead, we ask that the normal order be followed and a vote be held first on the two resolutions submitted by the 13 powers.⁷

U.S. Makes Final 1956 Payment to U.N. Refugee Fund

U.S./U.N. press release 2606

The U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., on February 1 transmitted to the Secretary-General a check for \$259,486, which is the final contribution toward the U.S. pledge of \$1,300,000 to the United Nations Refugee Fund for the calendar year 1956. The U.S. pledge to this fund was subject to the limitation that the U.S. contribution would be at the rate of one-third of all government contributions.

In addition the United States has given a total of \$5 million to the Secretary-General of the United Nations for emergency assistance to Hungarian refugees. Of this amount \$1 million was presented on November 13 and \$4 million on December 17, 1956.

⁷On Jan. 30 the Special Political Committee approved the two 13-power draft resolutions supporting admission of the Republics of Korea and Viet-Nam and rejected the Soviet-sponsored draft resolution. A motion to give priority to the India-Syria proposal was rejected at the start of the voting, and the sponsors did not press for a vote on the resolution.

February 25, 1957

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Finance

Agreement relating to the disposition of certain German assets in Thailand. Signed at Bangkok January 31, 1957. Entered into force January 31, 1957.

Signatures: France, Thailand, United Kingdom, United States.

Fur Seals

Interim convention on conservation of North Pacific fur seals. Signed at Washington February 9, 1957. Enters into force on date of deposit of the fourth instrument of ratification, and thereupon article IX, paragraphs 1 and 2, shall be deemed operative from June 1, 1956, provided the parties have fulfilled certain conditions specified in the convention.

Signatures: Canada, Japan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United States.

BILATERAL

Germany

Agreement relating to offshore procurement. Signed at Bonn April 4, 1955.

Entered into force: February 7, 1957 (date of deposit of instrument of ratification by the Federal Republic).

Greece

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of August 8, 1956 (TIAS 3633), by providing for purchase of evaporated milk and cheese. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens January 8 and 25, 1957. Entered into force January 25, 1957.

Agreement concerning financial arrangements for the furnishing of supplies and services to naval vessels. Effected by exchange of notes at Athens January 18 and 19, 1957. Enters into force April 19, 1957.

Haiti

Agreement for emergency drought assistance under title II, Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 454, 457). Effected by exchange of notes at Port-au-Prince December 26 and 28, 1956. Entered into force December 28, 1956.

Honduras

Convention for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Washington June 25, 1956.

Ratifications exchanged: February 6, 1957.

Entered into force: February 6, 1957, with effect on and after January 1, 1957 (the first day of the year in which exchange of ratifications took place).

Iran

Agreement amending the surplus agricultural commodities agreement of February 20, 1956 (TIAS 3506). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington January 29 and 30, 1957. Entered into force January 30, 1957.

Korea

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454, 455; 69 Stat. 44, 721). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington January 30, 1957. Entered into force January 30, 1957.

Liberia

Agreement for transfer of certain property located at Roberts Field to Liberia. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington April 19, 1955, August 21 and September 22, 1956. Entered into force January 4, 1957.

Philippines

Agreement providing for duty-free entry into the Philippines and exemption from internal taxation of relief supplies and packages. Effected by exchange of notes at Manila April 29, 1954, and October 18, 1956. Entered into force October 18, 1956.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Appointments

Wiley T. Buchanan as Chief of Protocol, effective February 4. For biographic details, see press release 15 dated January 11.

Consular Agencies

A consular agency was established at Las Palmas-Santa Cruz de Tenerife in the Canary Islands on October 12, 1956.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Department of State.

The Secretaries of State—Portraits and Biographical Sketches. Pub. 6402. Department and Foreign Service Series 58. 124 pp. \$1.

A publication making available for the first time reproductions of the portraits of the Secretaries of State from Thomas Jefferson through John Foster Dulles. The reproductions are arranged chronologically according to the terms of service of the Secretaries, and each reproduction

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Releases may be obtained from the News Division, Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Press releases issued prior to February 4 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 39 of January 25 and 47 of January 31.

No.	Date	Subject
*50	2/4	Buchanan sworn in as Chief of Protocol.
†51	2/4	Renegotiation of Canadian tariff concession on potatoes.
52	2/5	Robertson: "Meeting the Communist Threat in the Far East."
53	2/5	Dulles: news conference.
*54	2/6	McCullum sworn in as Deputy Administrator of SCA.
55	2/7	Economic talks with Poland.
*56	2/7	Reinhardt nominated Counselor.
†57	2/8	Reply to Swiss request concerning Interhandel.
58	2/8	Communique on EURATOM.
59	2/8	Tax convention with Honduras.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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